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The present study was undertaken as a first attempt to 
examine the relationship between the phenomenon of mood 
congruent recall and the defense mechanism of splitting. 
Because of the difficulties inherent in using an actual 
clinical population, an analog paradigm was utilized. In a 
pre-screening, subjects filled out the Millon Clinical 
Multiaxial Inventory-II Borderline Scale (MCMI-II BPD 
Scale), and two scales designed to measure the splitting 
defense (the Image Distorting Defense subscale of the 
Defense Style Questionnaire, and the Splitting Scale), and a 
median split procedure was used to classify subjects as high 
or low scorers. All subjects received a mood induction and 
then rated whether 54 trait adjectives (chosen from the top 
and bottom thirds of Anderson's likableness norms) applied 
to them or not. After a distractor task and another mood 
induction, incidental recall for these adjectives was 
tested. Both self-referencing congruency and recall
congruency of the high and low scorers of both sexes was
compared, utilizing four factor analyses of variance, with 
three between subjects factors (mood condition, personality, 
and sex) and one within subjects factor (congruent and non- 
congruent adjectives). The dependent measure for the first 
analysis was the number of adjectives self-referenced. For 
the second analysis it was the number of adjectives
recalled. It was hypothesized that lower scorers would show
self-referencing and recall congruency in positive moods 
only but that higher scorers would show congruency in both 
positive and negative moods. The experimental hypotheses 
were not supported. Instead, subjects generally 
demonstrated a positive bias in both self-referencing and 
recall, regardless of mood condition. However, higher 
scorers on the Splitting Scale and females who were higher 
scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale demonstrated significantly 
less positive bias than did other subjects, again regardless 
of mood. Possible reasons for and implications of this 
finding are discussed.
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
Can the "splitting1* of individuals with borderline 
personality disorder be explained as being the result of the
effects of mood states on memory and cognition? Or to put__
it another way, can the splitting defense be operationalized 
as mood congruent memory? This study was designed as a 
first attempt to answer this question.
Borderline Personality Disorder
The central feature of borderline personality disorder is
a pervasive instability of mood, self-image and
interpersonal relationships (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 1987).
A marked and persistent identity disturbance is 
almost invariably present. This is often 
pervasive, and is manifested by uncertainty about 
several life issues, such as self-image, sexual 
orientation, long-term goals or career choice, 
types of friends or lovers to have, or which 
values to adopt. The person often experiences 
this instability of self-image as chronic feelings 
of emptiness or boredom.
Interpersonal relationships are usually unstable 
and intense, and may be characterized by 
alteration of the extremes of overidealization and 
devaluation. These people have difficulty 
tolerating being alone, and will make frantic 
efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
Affective instability is common. This may be 
evidenced by marked shifts from baseline mood to 
depression, irritability, or anxiety, usually 
lasting a few hours or, only rarely, more than a 
few days. In addition, these people often have
1
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inappropriately intense anger or lack of control 
over their anger, with freguent displays of temper 
or recurrent physical fights. They tend to be 
impulsive, particularly in activities that are 
potentially self-damaging, such as spending 
sprees, psychoactive substance abuse, reckless 
driving, casual sex, shoplifting, and binge 
eating.
Recurrent suicidal threats, gestures, or 
behavior and other self-mutilating behavior (e.g., 
wrist scratching) are common in the more severe 
forms of this disorder. This behavior may serve 
to manipulate others, may be a result of intense 
anger, or may counteract feelings of numbness and 
depersonalization that arise during periods of 
extreme stress.
Some conceptualize this disorder as a level of 
personality organization rather than as a specific 
personality disorder. (p. 346)
Other Axis I or Axis II disorders are often present, and 
individuals with this disorder often have histories which 
include many different previous diagnoses. Their most 
salient feature is often the intensity and changeability of 
their affective states (Millon, 1981). Common complications 
are Major Depression, Dysthymia, Psychoactive Substance i 
Abuse, and Brief Reactive Psychosis (APA, 1987). This 
disorder is more often diagnosed in females than in males, 
and premature death from suicide is a real risk (APA, 1987). 
This disorder differs from cyclothymia in that while the 
borderline and the cyclothymic both manifest affective 
instability, the borderline does not manifest hypomanic 
episodes and the cyclothymic does. In some cases, however, 
both diagnoses may be warranted (DSM-III-R).
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Borderline personality disorder only made its way into the 
official diagnostic nomenclature in 1980, with the 
publication of DSM-III (Millon, 1981). Prior to that time 
the term was often used casually by clinicians to indicate 
that a patient was on the border, often between neurosis and 
psychosis (Millon, 1981). It was the work of diverse 
psychoanalytic theorists who focused mainly on intrapsychic 
features of the disorder that was primarily responsible for 
the delineation, development and popularization of the 
concept (Millon, 1981). As the concept developed, however, 
others focused on the relationship between borderline and 
both affective and psychotic disorders. Integrating the two 
traditions, Spitzer (1979), delineated two subgroups of 
borderline disorders, the schizotypal borderline and the 
unstable borderline, which evolved into the DSM-III 
Schizotypal and Borderline Personality Disorders. According 
to Millon (1981), the name Borderline PErsonality Disorder 
was chosen for the unstable borderline basically to appease 
the psychoanalytic theorists who had contributed so much to 
the development of the concept, although others felt that a 
name such as cycloid, unstable, ambivalent, erratic, 
impulsive, or labile personality would have been more 
descriptive.
Borderline Personality Disorder is conceptualized quite 
differently by different theorists. Some, such as Millon
4
(1981) and many psychoanalytic theorists (e.g. Kernberg, 
1975), see personality functioning as occupying a continuum 
between healthy and psychotic. To these theorists, 
Borderline personality is not conceptualized as a discrete 
homogenous syndrome but as a level of pathology or 
personality organization. But this is not the only area of
-h . . . .disagreement. Some attribute the etiology of this disorder 
to environmental influences, others see it as resulting from 
inherent predispositions, and still others see it as 
resulting from the interaction of the two. Most 
psychodynamic theorists view this disorder as resulting from 
the failure of the patient to negotiate a specific 
developmental stage, but theorists such as Millon (1981) 
view it as resulting form the cumulative effects of the 
patient's whole life experience. Various subgroups of 
patients with this disorder are identified by theorists, 
either on the basis of hypothesized relationships with other 
disorders, or on the basis of developmental differences, or 
some combination of both.
Theorists such as Davis and Akiskal (1986) and Klein 
(1977) take a biogenic tack. They point to the 
heterogeneity within the borderline syndrome. Basing their 
work on family studies showing an increased risk of 
alcoholism, bipolar depression and borderline personality 
disorder in first degree relatives of patients with
5
borderline personality disorder, different pharmacological
responses in subgroups of patients, and neurochemical 
abnormalities in primates whose early attachment bonds were 
^disturbed, they suggest that borderline personality disorder 
is actually a group of different syndromes with similar 
iehavioral manifestations.
Millon's (1981) theory integrates the biological findings
with social learning theory. As noted previously, he views
personality traits as lying on a continuum of adaptiveness.
In his view, borderline personality disorder is one of three
severe personality disorders, along with paranoid and
schizotypal personality disorders, which represent
deteriorated but stable more dysfunctional versions of less
pathological personality disorders. Millon describes four
subtypes of the borderline personality pattern; the
borderline/dependent, the borderline/compulsive, the
borderline/histrionic, and the borderline/passive-
aggressive. He sees the same etiological factors at work in
the lives of these patients as in their less severe
variations. He states:
The primary difference between them are the 
intensity, frequency, timing, and persistence of a 
host of potentially pathogenic features. Those 
who function at the borderline level may begin 
with less adequate constitutional equipment or be 
subjected to a series of more adverse early 
experiences. (1981, p. 364)
Most psychodynamic theorists view borderline personality
as a level of intrapsychic structural organization rather 
than as a specific personality disorder (Meissner, 1978).
In this view, the borderline is seen as having some traits 
more usually associated with neurosis and some traits more 
usually associated with psychosis and as therefore not 
^fitting into either classification. While psychotics are 
thought to manifest identity diffusion, primitive defense 
mechanisms, and loss of reality contact and neurotics are 
thought to manifest none of these symptoms, borderlines are 
thought to manifest identity diffusion and primitive 
_defenses but not a loss of reality contact (Settlage, 1977) 
Neurosis is viewed as resulting from Oedipal conflicts, and 
both psychosis and borderline personality organization are 
viewed as resulting from pre-oedipal conflicts. Psychotics 
are viewed as not having successfully negotiated the very 
earliest stage of development, in which the self and the 
mother are differentiated as separate objects, and 
borderlines are seen as having difficulty in a later stage 
in which object constancy develops. It is the borderline's 
development of and reliance on the splitting defense and 
other subsidiary defenses that results in the lack of 
behavioral and internal integration that is observed in 
individuals with this disorder.
Splitting
7
The concept of splitting is central to the modern 
psychodynamic conceptualizations of borderline personality 
disorder and is thought to be of both etiological and 
diagnostic importance. However, as Pruyser (1975) and 
Marmar and Horowitz (1986) point out, there is a great deal 
of confusion regarding the term splitting, and it is used in 
very different ways by different theorists.
Kernberg (1975), who's work was of central importance in 
the development of the borderline concept, defines splitting 
as:
an essential defensive operation of the borderline 
personality organization which underlies all 
others that follow. It has to be stressed that I 
am using the term splitting in a restricted and 
limited sense, referring only to the active 
process of keeping apart introjections and 
identifications of opposite quality. (p. 75)
In an earlier publication (1966), Kernberg states "what is
split is not only affect states of the ego but also object
images and self images" (p. 245). In developing his theory,
Kernberg drew on the work of Mahler (1968, 1971), who
posited that pathological splitting resulted from
difficulties in negotiating the rapproachment subphase of
the separation-individuation stage of development.
According to Mahler, some children may "split the object
world, more permanently than is optimal, into 'good' and
8
'bad7. By means of this splitting, the 'good7 object is 
defended against the derivatives of the aggressive drive" 
(1971, p. 413). As Lichtenberg and Slap (1973) note, "Both 
Mahler and Kernberg suggest that the earliest infantile 
experiences give rise to an organization of two sets of 
memory traces" (p. 777). These exist as "memory islands 
which contain imprints of 'pleasurable-good' or 'painful- 
bad' stimuli" (Mahler, 1968, p. 44). As a child matures, he 
or she becomes able to integrate these separate images and 
to perceive objects as wholes, except when these objects are 
the target of intense ambivalence. When object constancy is 
achieved, the child can substitute for the absent mother "a 
reliable internal image that remains relatively stable 
irrespective of the state of instinctual need or inner 
discomfort" (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975, p. 110). This 
implies the "unifying of the 'good' and 'bad' object into 
one whole representation (p. 110). Lichtenberg and Slap 
(1973) liken the two stages (pre and post object constancy) 
to the difference between a B movie and an A movie, "in the 
former the characters are all clearly good or evil, they are 
one dimensional; the characters in am A movie are more 
complicated, they have depth, they suffer from internal 
conflicts, and their characters have good and bad aspects." 
Mahler (1971) suggests that the development of pathological 
splitting may be the result of inadeguate mothering, while 
Kernberg (1975) stresses innate constitutional factors, even
9
suggesting that there may be a biologically based lack of 
integrative ability.
Pruyser (1975), questioning the defensive nature of
splitting, says of Kernberg's work:
His case material and that of others concerned 
with borderline conditions give justification for 
describing the patients' attitudes, transference 
reactions, emotional expressions, motor behaviors, 
and dealings with other people as appearing, at 
times, split and their intentions as splitting.
But here these words are used in the 
phenomenological sense describing behaviors being 
disjointed, fiercely contrasting with each other, 
staccato in their sudden flip-flops, and utterly 
lacking in that suavity, elegance, mutual 
softening, nice blending, or commonsensical give- 
and-take that we all see as the goal of desirable 
integration. The question is: Why should we 
invent a special intrapsychic act of splitting to 
account for these phenomena as if some internal 
chopper were at work to produce them? (p. 43)
Volkan (1976), however, who's conceptualization agrees with
that Kernberg (1975), Mahler (1971), and Lichtenberg and
Slap (1973), cites as evidence for the defensive nature of
splitting clinical examples in which patients are flooded
with intense primitive anxiety when their therapist
encourages them to integrate split representations.
Dorpat (1979), from a slightly different perspective from 
that Pruyser, questions the need to posit a specific defense 
mechanism of splitting, suggesting that the behaviors that 
are attributed to splitting can all be accounted for by the 
defense mechanism of denial. He suggests that in the
10
phenomenon that is called splitting, what is denied is the 
anger toward the need-fulfilling object, which results in 
the extreme alternations of affect toward objects that is 
usually referred to as splitting. Brenner (1981) counters 
with the argument that while denial of some aspect of 
reality is definitely an aspect of splitting, it is actually 
an aspect of all defensive operations.
Adding to the confusion, Kohut (1981) uses the terms 
vertical splitting and horizontal splitting to refer to two 
possibly very different processes that occur in narcissistic 
patients' the term vertical splitting refers to grandiosity 
and disavowed feelings of shame and low self esteem (this 
may be equivalent to the splitting of borderlines), and the 
term horizontal splitting refers to the split between 
primitive narcissistic needs and somewhat realistic 
expectations of others.
Although Masterson's (1985) theory differs generally from 
that of Kernberg (1975), his conceptualization of the 
defense mechanism of splitting is very similar to Kernberg's 
and Mahler's (1971). He speaks of rewarding and withdrawing 
part-units, which each consist of a part-self 
representation, a part-object representation, and a linking 
affect. Like Mahler, he stresses the role of maternal 
libidinal non-availability in the development of the
11
splitting defense.
Grostein (1981) distinguishes between two types of 
splitting, the first being an adaptive cognitive perceptual, 
discriminatory process which aids in adaptation, and the 
latter a defense mechanism. In agreement with Kernberg 
(1975), he postulates that in this second form of splitting, 
good and bad images of the self and others are kept apart to 
avoid the anxiety inherent in the contamination of the good^ 
object by aspects of the bad object.
Stolorow and Lachmann (1978) distinguish between what they 
term pre-stage splitting and defensive splitting, the first 
representing arrested development and the second, like the 
splitting of Kernberg, representing a defense against 
structural conflicts. Pre-stage splitting results from the 
inability of an individual to achieve object constancy, 
while in defensive splitting the individual possesses the 
ability to integrate opposing images but keeps them separate 
for defensive purposes. Cooper and Arnow (1984) have 
applied Stolorow and Lachmann's conceptualization to 
analyses of Rorschach responses and believe that they can 
distinguish the two types of splitting in Rorschach 
protocols.
Melito (1983) approaches the concept of splitting from a
12
more cognitive perspective. He integrates Piagetian stages
of cognitive development with psychodynamic notions of
splitting and argues for the congruity of the two
approaches. Central in his analysis are the Piagetian
concepts of centering and decentering. Noting that the
period in which object constancy and defensive splitting
develop in Kernberg's and Mahler's theories coincides with
the transition from the sensori-motor stage to the pre-
operational stage in Piagetian thought, he posits the
existence of "developmental" and "defensive splitting".
Developmental splitting is stage appropriate behavior and
results from the child's centration, or "concentration of
attention on a single thing such that different aspects of
reality are merely registered and not coordinated into an
organized system of relations" (p. 521). At the beginning
of the pre-operational period, the child has difficulty
"decentering onto memories of other perceptions relating to
the same content or situation" (p. 525). True conceptual
thought does not yet exist and concepts are understood in
terms of prototypes. As intuitive thought (the second stage
of pre-operational thought) develops, the child becomes a
to decenter his or her attention onto other images.
Speaking of the differences between developmental and
defensive splitting, Melito states,
If a subject is unable to integrate introjects 
because of cognitive immaturity (or even cognitive 
defect), we cannot speak of the resultant 
splitting as defensive since the resultant state
bid
is without motive. We can speak of splitting as a 
defense if the subject has the proven cognitive 
capacity (as perhaps demonstrated with respect to 
more neutral content) to decenter percepts and 
images and integrate them. (p. 530)
Thus, although he expresses agreement with Kernberg's
formulations, his own formulation would suggest that if, as
Kernberg (1966) has suggested, individuals who utilize the
splitting defense have a constitutional, physiological
inability to integrate opposing representations, then their
splitting cannot be considered as defensive.
Horowitz (1977) and Marraar and Horowitz (1986) also
approach splitting from a somewhat cognitive perspective,
integrating cognitive and psychodynamic formulations.
Horowitz (1977) states, "In terms of cognitive structure,
splitting refers to a segregation and multiplication of
inner schema of self and other. Instead of integrated,
realistic, and coherent self- and object- models, the person
schematizes role dyads on the basis of multiple /good/ and
'bad' self and object images." (p. 550). Marmar and
Horowitz (1986) describe splitting as "the dissociation
between two unique states" (p. 27) and state that its
defensive purpose is to protect the individual from the
disorganizing affects that would be entailed in a realistic,
integrated image of the object. They summarize the relevant
literature as follows:
Splitting refers to the segregation of the mental 
representations of the self and others, such that
14
part rather than whole images are formed. Objects 
may be seen as either all good or all bad rather 
than having both good and bad attributes. 
Similarly, strong currents of contradictory 
feelings, such as love for a person who is 
gratifying and hatred when the same person is at 
another point in time frustrating, are kept apart. 
When feelings of anger emerge toward the 
frustrating object, the person has no access to 
modulating memories of previous positive feelings 
which might temper the reaction to frustration. 
^The sense of perspective, which requires the 
'integration of mixed experiences across time, is 
impaired, leading to an unrealistic and at times 
dramatic overreaction to the experience of the 
moment. While these segregated affect states and 
related images of the self and others are 
accessible to consciousness at different moments, 
with neither side of the ambivalence is present in 
awareness at a given moment precludes the 
realistic integration of experience. (p. 23)
Thus, Marmar and Horowitz, as well as Melito and Mahler and
Kernberg, describe splitting as an affectively based,/
separation of internal representations or memories of self
and others.
While there has been much theorizing about splitting, 
largely based on informal clinical observation of borderline 
patients, there has been a dearth of empirical studies of 
the phenomenon. This is in large part due to the fact that 
operationalizing an inferred unconscious process is quite 
difficult. In recent years, however, psychodynamic 
theorists have attempted to remedy the problem by creating 
measures based on either clinicians ratings of the presence 
or absence of specific defenses, or self report measures of 
what have been termed "conscious mental derivatives" of
these unconscious processes. A defense scale has been 
developed based on clinicians' ratings, The Defense 
Mechanism Rating Scale (Perry & Cooper, 1986), but it 
requires lengthy clinical interviews by trained clinicians 
to administer and is thus often impractical for use in 
screening subjects for research participation. Two self- 
report measures have been developed to specifically measure 
splitting, the Splitting Scale (Gerson, 1984), and the Image 
Distorting Defense subscale of the Defense Style 
Questionnaire (Bond et al., 1983). Neither of these has 
been fully validated, however.
In order to clearly operationalize the concept of 
splitting, one must first analyze the concept and determine 
what splits, and on what basis. There appears to be a 
general agreement among theorists that first images or 
"memory traces", and later internal representations of the 
self and others are split along affective lines and that as 
Marmar and Horowitz point out, when these individuals are in 
one affective state, they have no access to contradictory 
memories that might modulate their experiences. If this is 
the case, then shouldn't these individuals demonstrate this 
mood congruent memory for information relating to themselves 
or to significant others in the laboratory as well as in 
real life? Shouldn't they also demonstrate stronger mood 
congruent memory effects for this type of information than
16
individuals who do not utilize this defense mechanism?
Memory Research
Two general areas of memory research seem to be 
particularly relevant to out understanding of splitting.
The first area of interest concerns the mnemonic effects of 
self-referencing of information and the other area is 
concerned with the effects of mood on memory.
Self-Referencing
It has been long noticed that people tend to learn new 
information by relating it to themselves (e.g., the intern 
syndrome in medical students or psychology graduate 
students) (Bower & Gilligan, 1979). What is the purpose of 
this, however? Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) and Bower 
and Gilligan (1979) initiated experiments to compare the 
memory enhancing properties of self-referencing of 
adjectives with other forms of processing. Rogers et al., 
utilizing an incidental recall paradigm, had subjects rate 
adjectives on their structural, phonemic, semantic, or self- 
referent qualities. They found that memory for adjectives 
that had been self-referred was far superior to adjectives 
that had been rated on other dimensions and that although 
yes rated items were recalled slightly better than no rated
items in the self-reference condition (yes or no ratings did 
not make a difference in other conditions), just the act of 
self-referencing created a strong mnemonic advantage. Bower 
and Gilligan, in two experiments, first compared recall of 
trait adjectives that had been judged by subjects as 
referring to themselves (either generally or by retrieving 
specific life episodes) with recall for adjectives that had 
been judged on the basis of their meaning or sound, and then 
in a second experiment compared recall for adjectives that 
had been judged in relation to the subjects' self, their 
mothers, or a less familiar individual (Walter Cronkite).
In the first experiment, they found that subjects exhibited 
superior memory for adjectives that had been self-referred 
(either on a general basis or by utilizing specific 
memories), and in the second experiment they found superior 
memory when subjects related adjectives to either themselves 
or their mother, but not when subjects applied them to the 
less familiar individual (Walter Cronkite). They also found 
that yes items were recalled slightly better than no items, 
but this effect did not reach significance. In interpreting 
their results, both of these sets of researchers noted that 
the self schema is a complex and highly differentiated 
cognitive concept and therefore enables subjects to 
associate list words to a number of different cues. Bower 
demonstrated the fact that this extends to concepts of 
significant others. Rogers et al. define the self as "an
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abstract representation of past experience with personal 
data...A more formal definition of self is to view it as a 
list of terms or features that have been derived from a 
lifetime of experience" (p. 677). They also noted that "in 
order for self-reference to be such a useful encoding 
process, the self must be a uniform, well-structured 
concept" (p. 686). Interpreted in this light, Bower's 
finding that judging information in relation to their 
mothers also produced powerful mnemonic effects in subjects, 
is particularly interesting. This agrees with notions of 
psychodynamic theorists who suggest that we all have 
internal representations of both ourselves and significant 
others. While in normal individuals, we would expect these 
internal representations or self-schema to be relatively 
stable and complex, in borderlines we would expect that 
these self representations are less stable and are affect 
bound. That is, borderlines should demonstrate less 
mnemonic advantage of self-referencing than others when 
their mood at recall differs from that during the self- 
referencing process.
Mood and Memory
Lets now turn our attention to the literature on mood and 
memory. In 1981, after a series of experiments in which 
subjects' moods were varied by use of hypnotic mood
induction procedures and the effects of these moods on 
memory and other cognitive processes were assessed, Bower 
proposed a theory of mood and memory that would fit within 
existing semantic network theories of long term memory such 
as those described by Anderson and Bower (1973) and Collins 
and Loftus (1975). "In this theory an emotion serves as a 
memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident 
events. Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of 
events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata 
for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual 
categorization." (Bower, 1981, p. 129). In 1984, Gilligan 
and Bower elaborated on this theory, listing seven 
postulates and four hypotheses that follow from those 
postulates. These hypotheses are: 1) STate Dependent Recall 
- memory is superior when recall state matches learning 
state; 2) Thought Congruity - thoughts, fantasies and 
memories tend to be congruent with current mood state; 3) 
Mood Congruity - material which is of a similar affective 
tone to a subject's current mood state is learned best; and 
4) Mood Intensity - learning is positively correlated with 
the intensity of the subject's mood state (Gilligan and 
Bower, 1984). In terms of splitting, Bower's second 
hypothesis, which he calls 'thought congruity', is most 
salient as it directly addresses current mood state and it's 
effect on availability of affectively congruent or non- 
congruent material.
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According to the Network Theory of Affect, recall 
congruency (i.e., the thought congruity 
hypothesis) occurs when an induced mood activates 
particular emotion nodes that bias the person to 
search memory for related material. This biased 
search, as well as activation spreading from the 
emotion node, results in increased availability of 
mood congruent memories. Individuals in 
particular mood states should be more likely to 
retrieve newly learned material and 
autobiographical memories congruent with their 
moods. (Singer & Salovey, 1988, p. 217)
In his 1981 paper, Bower describes an experiment on 'snap
judgments' in which subjects were asked to give brief
personality sketches of familiar people in their lives after
either a positive or negative mood was induced. He reports
that character descriptions were congruent with the
subjects' moods. He states:
Assuming heterogeneous impressions have been stored 
about familiar persons, we may suppose that current 
mood causes retrieval of primarily positive or 
primarily negative memories of a familiar person. In 
this way, the summary evaluation is thus biased by the 
availability of the positive versus negative features 
that come to mind. (p. 140).
Evidence for recall or thought congruity in other studies 
utilizing mood induction procedures has been mixed, although 
generally supportive, with some authors reporting congruity 
in both positive and negative moods, some reporting 
congruity in positive moods only and some reporting no 
congruity. These studies have used a variety of Mood 
Induction Procedures and a variety of dependent measures. 
Common mood inductions utilized include, hypnosis, self­
generated imagery and Velten (1968) mood statements. Other 
studies have used more subtle mood inductions such as music, 
weather, the receipt of a free gift, or false success or 
failure feedback. Common dependent measures include number 
of congruent versus non-congruent autobiographical memories 
recalled, latency of recall of positive or negative 
autobiographical memories, recall of positive and negative 
aspects of stories, and recall of adjective lists, although 
various other measures have also been utilized (Singer & 
Salovey, 1988).
Madigan and Bollenbach (1982), using Velten mood 
statements as mood inductions and autobiographical memories 
as the dependent measure found congruency effects for both 
positive and negative moods in three experiments. Teasdale 
and Russell (1981), Teasdale and Taylor (1981), and 
Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty (1980), all using Velton mood 
statements but using a variety of dependent measures, also 
found congruency for both positive and negative moods, as 
did Natale and Hantas (1982), using both hypnosis and Velten 
statements and a variety of dependent measures, and Snyder 
and White (1982), using Velten statements as a mood 
induction and autobiographical memories as a dependent 
measure. Wright and Mischel (1982), using self generated 
imagery and success or failure as mood inductions and self­
appraisal and performance expectations as dependent measures
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also found congruency for both positive and negative moods. 
An earlier study by Postman and Brown (1952), using success 
and failure as a mood induction and recognition threshold 
for positive and negative adjectives as a dependent measure, 
also found this congruency effect.
On the other hand, Bower, Gilligan, and Montiero (1981) in 
five experiments using hypnosis as a mood induction 
procedure and recall of positive or negative aspects of 
stories, failed to find the expected recall congruity 
effect. Gerrig and Bower (1982) also failed to find 
congruency, using hypnosis as a mood induction and speed of 
recognition of previously presented words as their dependent 
measure. Lack of congruity was also reported by Siegel, 
Johnson, and Sarason (1979) usinig the Velten mood induction 
technique and a life experience survey as a dependent 
measure. Bower and Mayer (1985) also failed to find this 
effect, again using hypnosis, but this time utilizing a two 
list interference recall paradigm. These failures to 
replicate his own earlier results led Bower (Bower & Mayer, 
1985) to question whether his earlier mood/memory 
formulation was too simplistic.
Isen et al. (1978) in two experiments in which the receipt 
of a free gift and success or failure were used as mood 
inductions, found congruency in ratings of consumer products
and recall of personality traits for positive moods only. 
Mischel et al. (1976), using success or failure as mood 
inductions found similarly skewed results, as did Nasby and 
Yando (1982) in one of two experiments using children as 
subjects. Two other studies, one by Riskind, Rholes, and 
Eggers (1982), and one by Schwarz and Clore (1983) also 
obtained somewhat asymmetrical results. Singer and Salovey 
(1988) have noted that in many of the studies in which 
recall congruency in both positive and negative moods has 
been found, this has been the result of increased or 
decreased availability of positive material and has not 
involved changes in availability of negative material at 
all. Both Isen (1978, 1985) and Singer and Salovey (1988) 
have suggested that what may be missing in Bower's 
mood/memory formulation is a motivational component. These 
authors suggest that people are motivated to maintain 
pleasurable experiences and to minimize or end unpleasant 
experiences. Therefore it is to be expected that while 
normal individuals may experience an automatic increase in 
mood congruent associations while in a negative mood state, 
they will attempt to counter this tendency by the use of 
controlled processes (e.g., counting their blessings, etc.). 
According to Isen et al. (1978), "Such persons may in fact 
have more easy access to negative material in memory, just 
as good-mood subjects have greater access to positive, but 
they may actively try to counter this tendency while the
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latter have no reason to do so." (p. 10). Singer and
Salovey (1988) suggest, "Given time, and a certain amount of 
higher order processing, more functional, negative mood 
repairing mechanisms might take over, returning the organism 
to its initial affective equilibrium" (p. 244). They 
suggest that one difference between the studies showing 
congruency in negative mood states and those that don't show 
this effect may be different time lags between mood 
inductions and dependent measures. Two other factors appear 
salient to this author. First, most of the studies that 
found significant recall congruency effects used strict 
subject selection criteria, only including subjects who 
demonstrated strong responses to the mood induction 
procedures. Also, many of these studies used primarily 
female subjects. Clark and Teasdale (1985), after noticing 
that female subjects tended to show stronger recall 
congruency for adjectives than male subjects did, designed 
two studies to test this directly and to look at possible 
reasons for this difference. They found that women did, in 
fact, show stronger recall congruency than men, although 
both sexes showed equivalent responses to the mood 
inductions. They ruled out the possibility that clustering 
(remembering mood congruent words cues recall of other 
congruent words) differed between the sexes. What they 
found in their second study was that usage ratings of 
personality trait, words differed between the sexes, with
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mean female usage ratings significantly above mean male 
ratings. They also found that women recalled more mood 
congruent than non-congruent high usage words but recalled 
similar numbers of congruent and non-congruent low usage 
words. They interpret their findings within associative 
network theories of mood and memory, noting that "the 
observed sex difference in the effects of mood on recall of 
pleasant and unpleasant words arises because activation of 
concepts denoted by these words has occurred more often in 
congruent mood states in the previous experience of women 
than of men" (p. 1602). They relate their findings to 
previous research findings that depression is more prevalent 
in women than in men, women are more likely than men to 
become depressed, and women take longer to recover from 
depression than men do, suggesting that women's enhanced 
recall of congruent material while in negative mood states 
might create a vicious cycle that would both lead to and 
perpetuate depression. This study is of particular interest 
in relation to borderline personality for three reasons: 
first, as noted previously, borderline personality disorder 
is more often diagnosed in females than in males; second, 
Dysthymia and Major Depression are often associated with 
this diagnosis; and third, it would seem that due to the 
instability of their moods, borderlines would have even more 
previous experience with associating evaluative trait 
concepts with mood states than would women generally.
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So far we have only considered studies that used mood 
induction procedures and normal subject populations. What 
sorts of results have been obtained in studies utilizing 
naturally occurring moods? These studies can be broken down 
into two main categories; those that use mood fluctuations 
in normal individuals, and those that use clinical 
populations. While the results using normal subjects have 
again been mixed, those studies that used clinical 
populations have generally provided stronger support for the 
mood congruency hypothesis (Singer & Salovey, 1988). For 
example, Clark and Teasdale (1982) found that depressed 
subjects generated more positive memories when they felt 
better and more negative memories when they felt worse. 
Mathews and Bradley (1983) found that more depressed 
subjects recalled fewer positive and more negative trait 
adjectives from a previously presented list. Lloyd and 
Lishman (1975) found that depressed subjects recalled more 
intensely negative memories and that speed of recall of 
positive associations was negatively correlated with degree 
of depression on the Beck Depression Inventory.
Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy (1977), in a study of 
hospitalized Bipolar patients, found that recall of 
previously generated associations negatively correlated with 
change in mood and that congruent associations were recalled 
best. In an interesting study in which they had subjects
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rate their liking of nonsense syllables, Slive et al. (1984) 
found that depressed subjects recalled more disliked 
nonsense syllables than non-depressed subjects. Kuiper and 
Derry (1982), compared recall congruency of previously self­
referenced trait adjectives in individuals who scored higher 
or lower on the Beck Depression Inventory. They found 
enhanced self-referent recall for non-depressed subjects for 
non-depressed content, and enhanced self-referent recall for 
depressed subjects for depressed content.
Rationale
Given all of the above evidence, it would seem likely that 
borderline subjects would show mood congruency in recall of 
previously self-referenced adjectives in both positive and 
negative moods while normal individuals would show this 
effect only in positive moods (or at least show weaker mood 
congruency in negative moods). Although demonstrating this 
effect in a clinical population would have been ideal, 
practical considerations precluded a study of that scope.
It was therefore hoped that by utilizing an analog paradigm, 
in which subjects were classified on the basis of higher or 
lower scores on measures designed to tap into 
characteristics of individuals with this disorder, these 
same effects would be demonstrated.
The study was designed to specifically look at elements of 
cognition and memory that are theoretically related to the 
splitting defense. An incidental recall paradigm utilizing 
self-referencing of trait adjectives as the orienting task 
was chosen for a number of reasons. First, personality 
trait adjectives are thought to be closely tied to self 
images or self schemas (e.g., Rogers et al.). Also, the use 
of this methodology allowed for two tests of the mood 
congruency hypothesis, one involving judgments about the 
self and one involving recall of information about the self. 
It was thought that the use of this particular methodology 
would provide information about the extent to which memory 
processes were involved in subjects' self judgments and 
therefore the splitting defense. If the results differed 
for the two tasks, it might suggest that processes other 
than mood congruent memory were involved in this defense 
mechanism. An incidental rather than an intentional recall 
paradigm was chosen to most closely resemble real life 
memory processes.
Hypotheses
It was hypothesized that parallel results would be found 
in the self-referencing and recall portions of the 
experiment, with low scorers demonstrating mood congruency 
of self-referencing and recall in positive moods, and high
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scorers demonstrating mood congruency of self-referencing 
and recall for both positive and negative moods. A general 
bias toward the positive was also expected.
Chapter II 
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 161 students at the University of
Montana, 72 of whom were female, and 89 of whom were male.
Their ages ranged from 18 to 48, with a mean of 24 and a
median of 21. Most of them were enrolled in an Introductory
Psychology course and participated in this study as a 
partial fulfillment of the research participation 
requirement of the class. A few of them were students in 
other psychology courses who volunteered their 
participation. The Introductory Psychology student subjects 
were recruited by means of sign up sheets posted in the 
psychology department, and the other subjects were recruited 
by sign up sheets distributed in their classes. Subjects 
were classified into high or low scoring groups by utilizing 
a median split procedure on scores on the personality 
measures. For the Introductory Psychology students, these 
scores were obtained at general pre-screenings at the 
beginning of the quarter, and for the other subjects these 
scores were obtained individually prior to their 
participation in the experimental portion of the study. All 
subjects were treated in accord with the "Ethical Principles 
of Psychologists" (American Psychological Association,1981).
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Personality Measures
All subjects were administered the Borderline subscale of 
the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-II (MCMI-II) 
(Millon, 1987), the Splitting Scale (Gerson, 1984), and the 
items forming the Image Distorting Defense subscale of the 
Defense Style Questionnaire (DSQ) (Bond et al., 1983) during 
the pre-screening at the beginning of the quarter (see 
Appendixes A, B, and C). The scaling of items from the 
Image Distorting Subscale was changed from nine to seven 
point Likert scales so that this scale could be combined 
with the Splitting Scale. (See Appendix D for combined 
scale).
The Borderline subscale of the MCMI-II was selected as a 
measure of the instability and affective lability associated 
with Borderline Personality Disorder. According to Millon 
(1987), the MCMI-II represents a refinement of the MCMI-I, 
and scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale correlate .79 
with scores on the MCMI-I Cycloid Scale (n = 756). For the 
MCMI-II Borderline Scale, Millon reports a Kuder-Richardson 
internal consistency coefficient of .92, and a test-retest 
stability for non-clinical populations of .79 after an 
interval of between three and five weeks. Varimax Rotated
factor analysis revealed eight factors for the MCMI-II 
generally; the Borderline Scale loads .63 on Factor One, 
which is interpreted as representing general maladjustment, 
.46 on Factor Two, which is interpreted as representing 
acting out tendency, and .32 on Factor Eight which is 
interpreted as representing interpersonal ambivalence, 
internal conflict, and erratic emotionality. Median Base 
Rate scores on the Borderline Scale for two groups of 
patients that had been previously diagnosed as suffering 
from Borderline Personality Disorder were reported as 73 (n 
= 60) and 79 (n = 99). For clinical populations, Millon 
claims a general predictive power of 90%. Although high 
correlations have been reported between this scale and a 
number of the other clinical scales, Millon reports that 
these are theoretically consistent. He also reports, 
however, that the presence of anxious or dysthymic states 
can artificially inflate scores on the Borderline Scale.
The Splitting Scale and the Image Distorting Defense 
Subscale of the DSQ were selected as measures of the 
hypothesized defense mechanism of splitting. Although they 
have not been well validated, they are the only published 
self-report scales that measure this elusive construct. 
Because of their relative lack of demonstrated empirical 
validity, they were not utilized to classify subjects for 
the primary analysis, but it was hoped that some further
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validation for these scales could be obtained by their 
inclusion in this study.
The items for the Splitting Scale were developed by Gerson 
in consultation with psychotherapists who were candidates or 
supervisors in a postdoctoral psychoanalytic training 
program. An attempt was made to create sentence stems that 
would reflect Kernberg's and Kohut's conceptions of this 
defense mechanism. External criterion validation was 
accomplished by correlating scores on this measure with 
scores on the NArcissistic Personality Disorder MMPI Scale 
developed by Ashby, Lee, and Duke (1979) and with the 
Rosenberg (1965) Self Esteem Scale. Data from 188 adults of 
varying economic status and ethnic background was included 
in this analysis. Of these subjects, 113 were female and 75 
were male. No significant sex or age differences were 
found. The correlation of splitting scores with scores on 
the Narcissistic Personality Disorder MMPI Scale was .25 (p 
< .01), and there was a significant negative relationship 
between scores on this scale and the Rosenberg Self Esteem 
Scale (r = -.41, p < .001). Gerson reports an item alpha 
coefficient of .71 (n = 75) (internal consistency). Test- 
retest reliability analysis with a three week lag in 
administrations yielded a product-moment correlation of .84 
(p < .001). Factor analysis of the scale revealed three 
factors; a major splitting factor, a grandiosity factor, and
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a factor interpreted as representing splitting in intimate 
relations. The mean score on the scale was 52.973, with a 
standard deviation of 11.464 and a range of 26 to 79 (out of 
a possible 98). Later cross validation of the scale by 
Glassman (1986) revealed a comparable mean (55.02) and 
standard deviation (9.82) and again no significant age or 
sex differences. However, his utilization of confirmatory 
rather than exploratory factor analysis revealed a different 
factor structure and suggested that three items of dubious 
psychometric value (items 1, 7, and 9) do not in fact belong 
on this scale. Pilot work for this study confirmed 
Glassman's finding that these three items do not correlate 
highly with other scale items or with the total scale score. 
Therefore, revised scale scores were utilized to classify 
subjects for analyses involving this scale.
The Defense Style Questionnaire (Bond et al., 1983) was 
designed to attempt to elicit "manifestations of a subject's 
characteristic style of dealing with conflict, either 
conscious or unconscious, based on the assumption that 
persons can accurately comment on their behavior from a 
distance" (p. 334). In pilot research utilizing thirty 
subjects, item-to-total correlations among items designed to 
measure the same defense were calculated and only items that 
correlated with their parent defense at a significance level 
greater than .001-were retained. Scores of 209 subjects
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(111 of whom were considered to be normal and functioning 
well and 98 of whom were psychiatric patients) were then 
correlated with two tests designed to measure ego 
development, and item-to-total correlations for each defense 
were again performed. It was found that defense scores 
correlated with the measures of ego development as they 
theoretically should have. Principal Component factor 
analyses revealed four factors. Factor Two (Image. 
Distorting Defenses) consisted of items which apparently 
measured splitting, omnipotence, and primitive idealization. 
All three defenses loaded greater than .50 on this factor. 
This factor had a significant positive correlation with the 
factor thought to measure immature acting-out defenses and a 
significant negative correlation with the factor thought to 
be measuring mature healthy defenses. In a later validation 
study (Bond et al., 1989) scores on the DSQ were correlated 
with scores on the Defense Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS) 
(Perry & Cooper, 1986), a scale that utilizes clinicians 
ratings of defense mechanisms; the Life Events Scale, a 
checklist questionnaire regarding life events; and the 
Health-Sickness Rating Scale. Complete data were obtained 
for 156 patients, 130 outpatients and 26 inpatients. In 
this study, scores on the Image Distorting Defense subscale 
significantly correlated with the DMRS immature defenses, 
with high Life Events Scale Scores and negatively correlated 
with age. However, of the twelve items that loaded on the
36
DSQ image-distorting factor in the previous study, only five 
correlated with the DMRS image distorting defenses and also 
with the DMRS immature defenses.
Mood Inductions
The mood induction procedure chosen for the first part of 
the study (self-referencing) was the use of music. As in 
the Clark and Teasdale (1985) study, subjects listened 
either to a passage from "Coppelia" by Delibes (positive 
condition), or to "Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke" by 
Prokofiev recorded at half speed (negative condition). In 
order to minimize demand characteristics, listening to the 
music was presented as one of the experimental tasks (see 
Appendix F for specific subject instructions). The music 
was played on a tape recorder that was hooked into a public 
address system in the research room. Each passage was seven 
minutes in duration.
The mood induction procedure chosen for the second part of 
the experiment was a modified version of the Velton Mood 
Induction Procedure (1968), similar to that used by Teasdale 
and Russell (1983). Subjects were asked to read booklets 
containing one statement on each page and to try to get into 
the feelings expressed by each statement (see Appendix F for 
mood statements and Appendix E for specific instructions).
This lasted for seven minutes.
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Manipulation Checks
For the first part of the study, the manipulation check 
was a three item questionnaire that asked subjects to rate 
the emotional tone of the music, their involvement in the 
music and their mood by means of seven point Likert scales 
(see Appendix G for complete subject packets). For the 
second part of the study subjects' moods were assessed by 
means of a seven point Likert scale, with anchors of very 
happy, neither happy nor unhappy, and very unhappy (again, 
see Appendix G).
Stimulus Material
The stimulus material consisted of individual slides of 54 
personality trait adjectives (in white, with blue 
backgrounds) that were presented on a screen at the front of 
the room for eight seconds each. The adjectives were 
selected from the list of 555 trait adjectives rated for 
likableness and published by Anderson (1968). One half of
the adjectives were selected from the upper third of norms
(likeable) and one half were from the lower third of norms
(unlikable). An attempt was made to choose words that had
low standard deviations, comparable meaningfulness ratings,
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comparable rankings, and different meanings. Except for the 
first and last six adjectives presented to the subjects, 
which were balanced for likableness, the order of 
presentation was determined randomly (see Appendix I for 
word list).
Procedure
When the subjects arrived at the research room, they were 
told that the study that they were participating in was 
concerned with various cognitive processes and that their 
mood would be assessed after each task. At each desk was a 
packet with all of the rating scales and other measures in 
the order in which they were to be utilized (with black 
sheets between each segment of the experiment). Specific 
subject instructions are contained in Appendix F, and a 
sample packet is contained in Appendix H.
After filling out the face sheets, the subjects were asked 
to listen to some music (mood induction one). They were 
told "please try to really get into it as we will be asking 
you some questions about your experience of it afterwards". 
After listening to the music, they were asked to answer the 
three questions asking them to rate their experience 
(manipulation check one). They were then told that next a 
number of adjectives would be presented to them on the
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screen at the front of the room and were asked to rate 
whether each one applied to them as it was presented. The 
fifty four adjectives were then presented to the subjects 
and they circled yes or no for each one to indicate whether 
it applied to them or not. This represented the self- 
referencing portion of the experiment.
Next, as a distraction, the subjects were asked to work on 
some arithmetic problems. At the end of eight minutes they 
were told to stop working and again asked to rate their 
mood. Neither the arithmetic problems nor the mood ratings 
were actually scored as part of the experiment.
Subjects were next asked to read through booklets 
containing one statement per page that they would find near 
their seats, and to try to get into the feelings described 
by each statement. They were told to continue reading the 
statements until they were asked to stop (mood induction 
two). After seven minutes they were asked to stop and to 
rate their moods (manipulation check two). They were then 
asked to write down as many of the adjectives from the blue 
slides as they could remember, in any order that they 
remembered them. This represented the recall portion of the 
experiment.
Chapter III 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Data 
Scores on Personality Measures
Scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale ranged form 0 to 
76, with a mean of 22.23, a median of 19, and a standard 
deviation of 16.04. There were no sex differences found on 
scale scores (two tailed t (155) = -.38, p =.71), and no 
differences in scores for the subjects in the two mood 
conditions (two tailed t (156) = -.81, p =.42).
Scores on the Splitting Scale-Revised ranged from 20 to 
64, with a mean of 42.9, a median of 43 and a standard 
deviation of 9.16. There were no sex differences found on 
scale scores (two tailed t (155) = .54, p =.59), and no 
differences in scores for the subjects in the two mood 
conditions (two tailed t (155) = -1.48, p =.14).
Scores on the Image Distorting Subscale of the DSQ ranged 
from 12 to 65, with a mean of 33.6, a median of 33 and a 
standard deviation of 10.46. Significant sex differences 
were found on scale scores (two tailed t (156) = -5.56, p. 
<.0001). Males scored higher on this scale than did females 
(M MALES = 37.3, M FEMALES = 28.9). However, no differences 
in scores were found for subjects in the two mood conditions 
(two tailed t (155) = -.85, p =.40).
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Correlations between Personality Measures
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For the subjects who participated in this study, Pearson 
product moment correlations were calculated between scores 
on the three personality measures. These all reached 
significance; the highest was between the MCMI-II Borderline 
Scale and the Splitting Scale-Revised (r = .568, p <.01, 
percent of variance accounted for =.32), the second highest 
was between the Splitting Scale-Revised and the Image 
Distorting subscale of the DSQ (r = .455, p <.01, percent of 
variance accounted for =.21), and the lowest was between the 
Image Distorting Subscale of the DSQ and the MCMI-II 
Borderline Scale (r = .262, p <.01, percent of variance 
accounted for =.07).
Because it was more fully validated, the experimental data 
was first analyzed using the MCMI-II Borderline Scale as the 
personality classification variable. However, scores on 
this measure were not normally distributed. For this reason 
and also to determine whether higher scorers on the two 
measures would behave in a similar manner, the data was then 
reanalyzed using the revised Splitting Scale as the 
personality classification variable. Because of the 
significant sex differences found on the Image Distorting 
Defense subscale, and also because of its weaker 
relationship with the other two personality measures,
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results were not analyzed utilizing this scale. It should 
also be noted that although pilot work had revealed sex 
differences in scores on the Revised Splitting Scale and 
heteroscedasticity in the relationship between the MCMI-II 
Borderline scores and the Revised Splitting Scale scores 
(see appendix E), for the experimental subjects the 
relationship between these measures was found to be 
homoscedastic.
Personality Measure Scores for High and Low Scoring Groups
Table One presents the descriptive statistics for the high 
and low scoring groups after the median split procedure was 
utilized to classify subjects.
Table One
Low Scorers 
Range 
Mean 
Median 
SD
MCMI-II BPD Splitting Scale (rev
0 to 18 
9.5 
10 
4.9
20 to 42 
35 
37 
5.7
High Scorers
Range 20 to 76 44 to 64
Mean 35 49
Median 30 50
SD 13 5.4
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Experiment - Part One - Self-Referencing 
Manipulation Checks - First Mood Induction
All of the manipulation checks were first analyzed 
utilizing scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale (BPD Scale) 
as the personality classification variable and then re­
analyzed utilizing scores on the revised Splitting Scale as 
the personality classification variable.
All of the analyses utilized a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial general 
linear model unbalanced analysis of variance (anova), with 
the first factor representing the mood condition (positive 
or negative), the second factor representing the personality 
factor (higher or lower scorers), and the third factor 
representing the sex of the subjects (male or female).
Analysis of Mood Ratings fMCMI-II BPD Scaled
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
condition, F (1,148) = 27.16, p <.001, MSe = 1.088, a 
significant main effect of sex, F (1,148) = 9.5, p<.002, MSe 
= 1.088, and a trend toward a two way interaction between 
the condition and personality factors, F (1,148) = 3.17, 
p<.10, MSe = 1.088, on subjects' ratings of their moods.
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Generally, subjects, regardless of personality or sex, 
rated their mood as more positive in the positive condition 
than in the negative condition (M POS = 3.245, M NEG =
4.131).
Males generally rated their mood as more positive than did 
females regardless of condition (M MALES = 3.426, M FEMALES 
= 3.950).
Although not reaching significance, there was a trend for 
lower scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale (LBs) to rate their 
mOod as more positive in the positive mood condition than 
higher scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale (HBs) (S* LBs =
3.085, M HBs = 3.405) and to rate their mood as more 
negative in the negative mood condition than high scorers (M 
LBs = 4.274, M HBs = 3.989). The reason for this is not 
clear as no pre-induction mood ratings were obtained. 
However, the lack of significant differences between the 
mood ratings of high and low scorers in the non-induced 
moods suggests that these subjects may have responded 
differently to the mood induction procedure or may have had 
a different perceptual set regarding mood intensity.
Analysis of Mood Ratings (revised Splitting Scale)
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
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condition, F (1,139) = 22.57, p<.001, MSe =1.108, a 
significant main effect of sex, F (1,139) = 2.96, pc.10, MSe 
= 1.108, on subjects' ratings of their moods.
As in the analysis that used MCMI-II BPD scores as the 
personality classification variable, subjects generally 
rated their moods as more positive in the positive mood 
condition than in the negative mood condition (M Positive = 
3.259, M Negative = 4.102).
Also consistent with the analysis using MCMI-II BPD scores 
to classify subjects was the finding that males generally 
rated their mood as more positive than did females (M Males 
= 3.40, M Females = 3.96) regardless of condition.
Inconsistent with the previous analysis, however, was the 
lack of a finding of a trend toward a condition by 
personality interaction and the finding instead of a trend 
toward a condition by sex interaction. This interaction 
(although not reaching significance) resulted from the fact 
that while the males' and females' mood ratings were not 
that different in the positive mood condition (M Males = 
3.13, H Females = 3.39), they were more different in the 
negative mood condition (M Males = 3.67, M Females = 4.54).
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Ratings of Emotional Tone of Music (MCMI-II BPD Scale 1
There was a significant main effect for condition, F
(1,148) =380.80, pc.001, MSe = 1.124, a significant (but 
uninterpretable) main effect for sex, F (1,148) = 3.94, 
p<.05, MSe = 1.124, on ratings of the emotional tone of the 
music.
Generally, all subjects, regardless of personality or sex, 
rated the positive condition music as more happy than the 
negative condition music (M POS = 2.285, M NEG = 5.659).
In the positive mood condition, LB Males and HB Females 
rated the music as most happy (M LBMs = 2.0, M HBFs =
2.143), while HB Males and LB Females rated the music as 
least happy (M HBMs = 2.476, M LBFs = 2.522). In the 
negative mood condition, LB and HB Females rated the music 
as most unhappy (M LBFs = 5.929, M HBFs = 6.053), LB Males
rated the music as somewhat less unhappy (M LBMs = 5.524),
and the HB Males rated the music as least unhappy (M HBMs =
5.130). This is interesting, in that the ratings of the
happiness of the music by HB Females contrast with their 
mood ratings. While their ratings of the emotional tone of 
the music are more extreme than those of the low scoring 
Females, their ratings of their moods tend to be more 
neutral.
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Ratings of Emotional Tone of Music (revised Splitting Scaled
This analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
condition, F (1,139) = 336.60, pc.001, MSe = 1.156, and a 
significant main effect of sex, F (1,139) =4.72, p<-05, MSe 
= 1.156, on ratings of the emotional tone of the music.
Generally, subjects in the positive mood condition rated 
the music as more happy than subjects in the negative mood 
condition (M positive = 2.30, M negative = 5.63).
Males generally rated the music as more happy than did 
Females regardless of condition (M Males = 3.77, M Females = 
4.16).
This analysis contrasts with the analysis in which the 
MCMI-II BPD Scale was used to classify subjects, in that in 
this analysis the personality factor did not interact with 
the condition and sex factors.
Ratings of Involvement in Music
No significant effects were found for the condition, 
personality, or sex factors on subjects' ratings of their 
involvement in the music when using either the MCMI-II BPD 
Scale or the revised Splitting Scale to classify subjects.
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Self-Referencing Analyses and Results
The self-referencing data was first analyzed utilizing 
scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale as the personality 
classification variable and then was reanalyzed using scores 
on the revised Splitting Scale to classify subjects. The 
data was then analyzed separately for each sex, again using 
scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale as the personality 
classification variable.
Each of these analyses utilized a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  unbalanced 
analysis of variance (anova) with three between subjects 
factors (mood condition, personality classification, and 
sex) and one within subjects repeated measure factor 
(congruent vs non-congruent adjectives). For each analysis 
the dependent measure was the number of adjectives rated as 
applying to the self.
Table Two contains the significant F ratios for effects 
involving the congruence factor that were obtained in each 
analysis. In general, the results were similar when using 
the MCMI-II BPD scores and the Splitting Scale scores as the 
personality classification variable. Analyzing the data for 
each sex separately revealed a different pattern of results 
for males and females, however, although this was not 
apparent in the combined analyses.
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Table 2 (Self-Referencing)
F Ratios For Effects Involving Congruence Factor
Factors BPD Splitting Females Males
COND X CONG 409.16 388.89 152.48 274.54
■kick *** *** k k k
COND X PERS X CONG 9.52 3.72 6.44 3.00** * ** (t)
*** = pc.001, ** = pc.Ol, * = p<. 05, (t) = .05 < p < .10
The hypothesized condition by congruence interaction was 
found in all analyses, indicating the general bias towards 
positivity in self-referencing. The hypothesized three way 
interaction between the condition, personality, and 
congruence factors was also found, although this interaction 
was not in the form expected. In addition, this interaction 
differed in males and females.
Several other significant results were found that did not 
involve the congruence factor. For these analyses the 
dependent variable was the mean number of adjectives self- 
referenced (collapsing over the congruence factor). The F 
ratios for these effects that were significant or that 
approached significance in each analysis are presented in 
Table Three.
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Table 3 (Self-Referencing)
F Ratios For Effects Involving Between Subjects Factors
Factors
MCMI-II
Score
Splitting
Score
Females
Only
Males
Only
PERS 4.75* 3.01 (t) 3.30 (t)
SEX 3.74* NA NA
C X P 6.53**
P X S 3.22 (t) NA NA
CXPXS 3.26 (t) NA NA
** = pc.Ol, * = p<.05, (t) = .05 < p < .10
As can be seen in Table three, the patterns of results are 
somewhat different for each analysis. Results differ when 
utilizing the MCMI-II BPD Scale or the Splitting scale s the 
personality classification variable. In addition, a 
different pattern of results is obtained for males and 
females.
Analysis of Data For All Subjects - Using MCMI-II BPD Scale
For this analysis, there were 156 subjects with usable 
data of whom 70 were female and 86 were male.
Analysis of the self-referencing data revealed a 
significant condition by congruence effect, F (1,148) = 
409.16, pc.001, MSe = 28.4, and a significant condition by
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personality by congruence effect, F (1 *1 4 8 ) = 9.52, p<.002, 
MSe = 28.4.
Figure One graphically represents the condition by 
congruence interaction. As can be seen in this figure, in 
the positive mood condition, subjects rated more congruent 
that non-congruent adjectives as applying to themselves (M 
CONG = 24.73, M NCONG = 12.805), and in the negative mood 
condition this effect was reversed (H CONG = 11.963, M NCONG 
= 24.894). Or to state it another way, subjects generally 
rated more positive than negative adjectives as applying to 
themselves, regardless of mood condition.
Figure 1
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the three way 
interaction between the condition, personality, and 
congruence factors. As can be seen in this figure, the 
significant three way interaction results from the fact that 
although there is not a significant difference between the 
number of congruent (positive) adjectives or non-congruent 
(negative) adjectives that HB and LB subjects rate as 
applying to themselves in the positive mood condition or the 
number of non-congruent (positive) adjectives that the two 
groups rate as applying to themselves in the negative mood 
condition, HBs rate significantly more congruent (negative) 
adjectives as applying to themselves than do LBs in the 
negative mood condition.
Figure 2 
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Although not of primary interest, several other 
significant effects were observed. These were a significant 
main effect of personality, F (1,148) = 4.75, p<.05, MSe = 
40.90, a significant main effect of sex, F (1,148) = 3.74,
p<.05, MSe = 40.90, and a trend toward a three way 
interaction between the condition, personality, and sex 
factors, F (1,148) = 3.26, pc.10, MSe = 40.90, on the mean
number of adjectives rated as applying to the self
(collapsing over congruence factor). Figure 3 is a 
graphical representation of these results.
Figure 3 
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Higher scorers generally rated more adjectives as applying 
to themselves than did lower scorers, and females rated more 
adjectives as applying to themselves than did males.
However, interpretation of these findings must be tempered 
by the trend toward a three way interaction between the 
condition, personality, and sex factors. As can be seen in 
Figure 3, female higher scorers rated more adjectives as 
applying to themselves than did other subjects regardless of 
condition. Females (both higher and lower scorers) rated 
similar numbers of adjectives as applying to themselves in 
the two mood conditions, as did males who were higher 
scorers. However, males who were lower scorers rated more 
adjectives as applying to themselves in the positive 
condition than in the negative condition.
Analysis of Data For All Subjects -Utilizing Splitting Scale
For this analysis, there were 147 subjects with usable 
data, 67 of whom were female and 80 of whom were male. In 
other respects, this analysis was identical to the previous 
one.
Analysis of this data utilizing Splitting Scale scores as 
the personality classification variable reveals a similar 
pattern of significant results as was obtained using MCMI-II 
Borderline Scores. A significant condition by congruence 
effect, F (1,139) = 388.89, p<.001, MSe = 29.39, and a 
marginally significant condition by personality by 
congruence effect, F (1,139) = 3.72, p = .056, MSe = 29.39,
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were found.
Figure 4 is a graphical representation of these results.
As can be seen in this figure, higher and lower scorers 
rated the same number of congruent (positive) adjectives as 
applying to themselves in the positive mood condition, and 
the same number of non-congruent (positive) adjectives as 
applying to themselves in the negative mood condition. 
However, higher scorers rated more non-congruent adjectives 
as applying to themselves in the positive mood condition 
than did lower scorers, and also more congruent adjectives 
as applying to themselves in the negative mood condition. 
Also, while higher scorers rated about the same number of 
adjectives as applying to themselves in both conditions, 
lower scorers rated less negative adjectives as applying to
Figure 4 
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In addition, there were non-significant trends toward a 
main effect of personality, F (1,139) = 3.01, p<.l0, MSe =
42.45, and toward a two way interaction between the 
personality and sex factors, F (1,139) = 3.22, p<.10, MSe =
42.45, on the mean number of adjectives rated as applying to 
the self (collapsed over the congruence factor). Figure 5 
is a graphical representation of these results.
Figure 5
Personality x Sex Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 5, higher scoring females rated 
more adjectives as applying to themselves than did other 
subjects, who rated approximately equal numbers of 
adjectives as applying to themselves.
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Sex Differences in Self-Referencing by MCMI-II BPD Scores
The same three way interactions between the condition, 
personality, and congruence factors were found when 
analyzing the data for males and females separately.
However, these interactions were somewhat different for the 
two sexes. Generally, higher scoring females rated more 
negative adjectives as applying to themselves in both mood 
conditions than did lower scoring females. On the other 
hand, higher scoring males rated more negative adjectives as 
applying to themselves than did lower scoring males in the 
negative mood condition only.
Females Only
Analysis of the females' self-referencing data revealed a 
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,66) = 
152.48, pc.001, MSe = 30.64, and a significant condition by 
personality by congruence interaction, F (1,66) = 6.44, 
pc.Ol, MSe = 30.64.
As can be seen in Figure 6, these results are slightly 
different from those obtained when including male subjects. 
HB and LB females do not differ in the number of congruent 
(positive) adjectives that they rate as applying to 
themselves in the positive condition, or in the number of
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non-congruent (positive) adjectives that they rate as 
applying to themselves in the negative condition. However, 
HB females rate more non-congruent (negative) adjectives as 
applying to themselves in the positive condition and more 
congruent (negative) adjectives as applying to themselves in 
the negative condition than do LB females. Or to put it 
another way, higher scorers rated more negative adjectives 
as applying to themselves than did lower scorers, regardless 
of mood condition.
Figure 6 
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There was also a trend toward a main effect for 
personality, F (1,66) = 3.3, pc.10, MSe = 42.18, on the mean 
number of adjectives rated as applying to the self 
(collapsing over the congruence factor), although this 
effect did not reach significance. Generally, high scoring 
females rated more adjectives as applying to themselves than 
did low scoring females (M HBF = 22.83, M LBF = 18.29).
Males Ohlv
Analysis of the males' self-referencing data revealed a 
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,82) = 
274.54, pc.001, MSe = 26.6, and a trend toward a condition 
by personality by congruence interaction, F (1,82) = 3.0, 
p<.10, MSe = 26.6.
Figure 7 is a graphical representation of these results.
As can be seen in this figure, these results differ from 
those of the females in that while HB males rate more 
congruent (negative) adjectives as applying to themselves in 
the negative condition than do LB males, the LB and HB males 
do not differ in the number of non-congruent (negative) 
adjectives that they rate as applying to themselves in the 
positive condition.
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Figure 7
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Analysis of the males' ratings also revealed a significant 
condition by personality interaction, F (1,82) = 6.53, p = 
.10, MSe = 39.86, on the mean number of adjectives rated as 
applying to the self (collapsed over the congruence factor).
Figure 8 is a graphical representation of this 
interaction. As can be seen in this figure, males who were 
low scorers rated more adjectives as applying to themselves 
in the positive mood condition than in the negative mood 
condition, while for males who were high scorers this 
pattern was reversed.
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Figure 8 
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Self-Referencing Results Summary
The results of the self-referencing analyses do not 
generally support a mood congruency hypothesis in judgments 
about the self. Instead, a bias toward positivity in self- 
referencing was generally found, although this was stronger 
for low scorers than for high scorers on the two personality 
measures. In addition, high scoring females differed from 
high scoring males in that the high scoring females rated 
more negative adjectives as applying to themselves than did 
low scoring females regardless of mood condition, while high 
scoring males rated more negative adjectives as applying to 
themselves than did low scoring males in the negative mood
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condition only.
Considered in isolation, the results for males could 
conceivably provide some support for personality differences 
in mood congruency of self-referencing. However, this is 
complicated by the results for females, which suggest a 
lessening of positive bias in high scorers rather than mood 
congruency per se, since female high scorers rated equal 
numbers of negative adjectives as applying to themselves 
regardless of their mood. This suggests that high scoring 
males and females may differ in some important aspects.
Experiment - Part Two - Recall 
Manipulation Check - Second Mood Induction
Mood ratings were analyzed first using the MCMI-II BPD 
Scale as the personality classification variable and then 
re-analyzed using revised Splitting Scale scores to classify 
subjects.
Both analyses utilized a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial general 
linear model unbalanced analysis of variance (anova). The 
first factor represented the mood condition, the second 
factor represented the personality classification and the 
third factor represented the sex of the subject.
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Analysis of the mood ratings with the MCMI-II BPD Scale as 
the personality classification variable revealed a 
significant effect of condition, F (1,148) = 51.1, p<.001, 
MSe = 1.869, and no significant effects of the personality 
or sex factors. Subjects rated their moods as most positive 
in the positive mood condition (M = 3.155, SD = .16) and 
most negative in the negative mood condition (M = 4.748, SD 
= .16).
Analysis of the mood ratings with the revised Splitting 
Scale as the personality classification variable revealed a 
significant main effect of condition, F (1,139) = 56.84, 
p<.001, MSe = 1.701, and a significant two way interaction 
between the condition and personality factors, F (1,139) = 
5.46, p<.05, MSe = 1.701. Although all subjects generally 
rated their moods as more positive in the positive mood 
condition than in the negative mood condition, higher 
scorers rated their moods as more positive in the positive 
mood condition than did lower scorers (Ji HS = 2.65, M LS = 
3.49), and slightly more negative in the negative mood 
condition (H HS = 4.82, £| LS = 4.64).
Recall Analyses and Results
For the recall data, analyses utilizing four separate 
dependent measures were conducted. The congruency of
subjects' intrusions was analyzed first. An analysis was 
then conducted combining the recalled list items and the 
subjects' intrusions to form the dependent measure. Recall 
of the adjectives that were actually presented to the 
subjects was analyzed, and then another analysis was 
conducted excluding the first and last six adjectives that 
were presented to the subjects.
As with the self-referencing data, the recall data was 
first analyzed using MCMI-II BPD Scale scores to classify 
subjects, and was then re-analyzed utilizing the revised 
Splitting Scale scores as the personality classification 
variable. Separate analyses were also performed for each 
sex. The only exception to this is the intrusion data, 
which was not re-analyzed because no significant sex or 
personality differences were found involving the congruence 
factor.
Each of these analyses utilized a four factor unbalanced 
analysis of variance, with three between subjects factors 
(mood condition, personality classification, and sex) and 
one within subjects repeated measure factor (congruent vs 
non-congruent adjectives). Each of these factors has two 
levels.
The results of these analyses are summarized in Tables
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Four and Five. Table Four presents the F ratios for effects 
involving the congruence factor that approached or reached 
significance. As this table illustrates, the results of 
these analyses are less clear cut than the results of the 
self-referencing analyses. Generally, the hypothesized 
condition by congruence interaction is found, indicating a 
bias toward positivity in recall. However, the hypothesized 
three way interaction between the condition, personality, 
and congruence factors is found in some analyses but not in 
others, and again this interaction is not in the form 
expected. Also, the only real evidence for mood congruence 
is found in the analysis of subjects' intrusions, and no 
personality differences involving the congruency factor are 
found in this analysis. One interesting finding is that 
when we exclude the first and last six adjectives presented 
to the subjects from our analysis, almost all interactions 
involving the congruence factor disappear, and the one 
effect that remains does not reach significance.
Table Four (Recall)
F Ratios For Effects Involving Congruence Factor
IntrusionsBPD Rftcall + I BPD Sp F M
Recall BPD Sp F M Excluding BPD Sp F M
Cong (C) 46. IS *** 3.0(t)
COHDxC 63.36*** 3S.S6 41.67 11.65 27.68 *** *** *** *** 5.61 7.36 5.91 * ** * 2.94<t)
CxPxC S.11 3.99 * * 2.83 2.79(t) <t>
CxPxCXS NX HA 2.92 HA HA(t)
MX MX
*** «. p< .OOl ̂ ** *• p<.OX, * - p<.05, (t) * p<-10
Inspection of Table Four reveals that the three way
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condition by personality by congruence interaction was only 
found when analyzing the data for women separately or when 
the data was analyzed utilizing the Splitting Scale as the 
personality classification variable. Also, this effect only 
reached significance when intrusions were combined with 
actually recalled items to form the dependent variable.
Table Five contains the F ratios for each of the analyses 
that did not include the congruence factor and that were 
significant or approached significance.
Table Five (Recall)
F Ratios For Effects Involving 
Between Subjects Factors
IntrusionsBPD BPD sp F M BPD Sp F M BPD Sp F M
Condi 7.23** 2.8<t>
Pers 4.36* 4.23* 3.03(t>
2.9
Sex 12.73*** 10.1** HA HA 14.37*** 12.5*** HA HA 13.65*** 12.32*** HA NA
CXP 15.27*** 3.23<t)
9.15** 3,01(t)
8.77**
Cxs 3.26(t) HA HA 3.22<*)
3.26<t) HA HA 3.12(t.) 2.81<t) HA
HA
PxS 3.76(t) HA HA
3.76
<t)
HA HA HA HA
CxPxS 6.15** 17.6*** 7. 95 ** NA HA 10.19** HA HA 8.32** HA HA
*** - p<. 001, ** « pc.oi, * - p< os. (t) - 05<p<.LO
As Table Five indicates, a more consistent pattern of 
results is found for effects not involving the congruence 
factor. In all but one of the analyses combining subjects 
of both sexes, significant condition by personality by sex 
interactions were found on the mean number of adjectives
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recalled (collapsed over congruence). Significant 
interactions were also found between the condition and 
personality factors in all of the analyses utilizing female 
subjects. However, the only effects found in the analyses 
for male subjects are when intrusions are included with 
recall. In this analysis, a significant main effect for 
personality was found as was a non-significant trend toward 
an interaction between the condition and personality 
factors. The results for these analyses will described in 
more detail.
Intrusions
There were 156 subjects with usable data for this 
analysis, 70 of whom were female and 86 of whom were male. 
The MCMI-II BPD Scale was used as the personality 
classification variable.
This analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
congruence, F (1,148) = 146.15, pc.001, MSe = 2.63, as well 
as a significant two way interaction between the condition 
and congruence factors, F (1,148) = 63.36, p<.00l, MSe = 
2.63. Figure 9 is a graphical representation of these 
results.
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Figure 9
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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As can be seen in this figure, subjects in both conditions 
had more congruent than non-congruent intrusions, although 
this effect was much greater in the positive mood condition 
than in the negative mood condition.
A significant main effect of condition, F (1,148) = 7.23, 
pc.Ol, MSe - 3.79, and a significant three way interaction 
between the condition, personality, and sex factors, F
(1,148) = 6.15, p<.05, MSe = 3.79, on the mean number of 
intrusions (collapsed over the congruence factor) were also 
observed. Figure 10 is a graphical representation of these 
results.
Figure 10
Condition x Personality x Sex
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As can be seen in this figure, in the positive mood 
condition HB females had the most intrusions and LB females 
had the least, while in the negative mood condition LB 
females and HB males had the most intrusions, HB females had 
slightly less intrusions, and LB males had the least.
Recall Plus Intrusions
The results of the analyses of recall with intrusions 
(including both female and male subjects) differ when 
utilizing the MCMI-II BPD Scale or the Splitting Scale as 
the personality classification variable. When using the 
MCMI-II BPD Scale, only the condition by congruence 
interaction was significant, but when using the Splitting
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Scale both this interaction and the Condition by Personality 
by Congruence interactions were significant. Analyses of 
this data for each sex separately (again using the MCMI-II 
BPD Scale to classify subjects) revealed different patterns 
of results for the two sexes. Females who were classified 
on the basis of their scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale had a 
similar pattern of results as subjects who were classified 
on the basis of their Splitting Scale scores, while male 
subjects showed only the Condition by Congruence effect, as 
did the combined sample when classified on the basis of 
their scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale.
Recall Plus Intrusions - Utilizing MCMI-II Borderline Scale
Analysis of this data revealed a significant condition by 
congruence effect, F (1,148) = 36.56, pc.001, MSe = 7.87, 
and no other significant effects involving the congruence 
factor. Figure 11 is a graphical representation of these 
results.
As can be seen in Figure 11, subjects recalled (and 
misrecalled ) more congruent adjectives when in the positive 
mood condition and more non-congruent adjectives while in 
the negative mood condition.
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Figure 11
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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There was also a significant main effect for personality, 
F (1,148) = 4.36, p<.05, MSe = 13.87, a significant main 
effect for sex, F (1,148) = 12.73, p<-001, MSe = 13.87, and 
a three way interaction between the condition, personality, 
and sex factors, F (1,148) = 17.61, pc.001, MSe = 13.87 on 
the mean number of adjectives recalled (collapsed over the 
congruence factor). Figure 12 graphically represents these 
results.
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Figure 12
Condition x Personality x Sex
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As can be seen in Figure 12, HB females recalled the most 
adjectives in the positive mood condition, while HB males 
recalled the most adjectives in the negative mood condition. 
On the other hand, LB females recalled the most adjectives 
in the negative mood condition, while LB males recalled 
about the same number in each condition.
Recall Plus Intrusions - Utilizing Revised Splitting Scale
Utilizing the Revised Splitting Scale as the personality 
classification variable, a significant condition by 
congruence interaction was obtained, F (1,139) = 41.67, 
p<.001, MSe = 7.69, as was a significant condition by 
personality by congruence interaction, F (1,139) = 5.11,
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p<. 05, MSe = 7.69. Figure 13 is a graphical representation 
of these results.
Figure 13 
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As can be seen in Figure 13, low scorers on the splitting 
scale recalled about the same number of congruent adjectives 
as high scorers did in both the positive and negative mood 
conditions. However, while high scorers recalled more non- 
congruent adjectives than low scorers did in the positive 
mood condition, in the negative mood condition this pattern 
was reversed.
In this analysis, two other significant effects were 
observed. There was a significant main effect of sex, F
(1,139) = 10.10, pc.01, MSe = 15.24, and a significant three 
way interaction between the condition, personality, and sex
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factors, F (1,139) = 7.95, pc.Ol, MSe = 15.24, on the mean 
number of adjectives recalled (collapsing over the 
congruence factor). Figure 14 graphically represents these 
results.
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Females only
Analyzing the data for females separately reveals the same 
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,66) = 
11.65, p>.001, MSe = 7.43, as was found for all subjects. 
However, a significant three way interaction was also found 
between the condition, personality, and congruence factors,
F (1,66) = 3.99, p<.05, MSe = 7.43.
As can be seen in Figure 15, HB females recalled (and
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misrecalled) similar numbers of congruent and non-congruent 
adjectives in both the positive and the negative mood 
conditions, although they recalled more of both kinds in the 
positive mood condition. LB females, however, recalled (and 
misrecalled) significantly more congruent than non-congruent 
adjectives in the positive mood condition, and significantly 
more non-congruent than congruent adjectives in the negative 
mood condition.
Figure 15
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Figure 16
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As can be seen in Figure 16, there was also a significant 
condition by personality interaction, F (1,66) = 15.27, 
p<.001, MSe = 15.02, on mean number of adjectives recalled 
(collapsing over the congruence factor), with HB females 
recalling more adjectives in the positive mood condition and 
LB females recalling more adjectives in the negative mood 
condition.
Males Only
The data for males differs from the data for females in 
that the only significant effect involving the congruence 
factor is the condition by congruence interaction, F (1,82)
= 27.68, p<.001, MSe = 8.22.
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Figure 17
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 17, males recalled significantly 
more congruent than non-congruent adjectives in the positive 
mood condition and significantly more non-congruent than 
congruent adjectives in the negative mood condition. This 
parallels the findings when both males and females are 
included in the analysis, and also the findings for low 
scoring females.
List Recall
Analyzing the recall data without including the subjects' 
intrusions revealed a similar pattern of results as the 
analyses with intrusions did, although the results for these 
analyses were not as strong. Significant condition by
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congruence interactions were found in all the analyses 
except for the separate analysis of the female data.
Although not reaching significance, trends toward a 
condition by personality by congruence interaction were 
observed in the analysis using the Splitting Scale as the 
personality classification variable and in the separate 
analysis of the female data. A trend toward a four way 
interaction between the condition, personality, sex, and 
congruence factors was found when the MCMI-II BPD Scale was 
used as the personality classification variable.
List Recall by MCMI-II Borderline Scale
A significant condition by congruence interaction, F
(1,148) = 5.61, p<.05, MSe = 5.92, and a trend towards a 
four way interaction between the condition, personality, sex 
and congruence factors, F (1,148) = 2.92, p<.10, MSe = 5.92, 
was found for recall of list items.
As can be seen in Figure 18, subjects generally recalled 
more congruent than non-congruent adjectives when in a 
positive mood and more non-congruent than congruent 
adjectives when in a negative mood. However, as can be seen 
in Figure 19, interpretation of this finding should be 
tempered by the trend toward a four way interaction which 
suggests that thi« holds true for all subjects except the HB
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females who recall about the same number of congruent and 
non-congruent adjectives in both moods, although they recall 
more of both types in the positive mood condition.
Figure 18 
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A significant main effect of sex, F (1,148) = 14.37, 
pc.001, MSe = 13.07, a significant three way interaction 
between the condition, personality, and sex factors, F
(1,148) = 10.19, pc.01, MSe = 13.07, and a trend toward a 
main effect for personality, F (1,148) = 3.03, pc.10, MSe = 
13.07, on the mean number of adjectives recalled (collapsed 
over the congruence factor) were also observed. As Figure 
20 illustrates, while both HB and LB females recalled more 
adjectives in the positive mood condition than HB and LB 
males, and LB females recalled more adjectives than LB males 
in the negative condition, in this condition HB males 
recalled more adjectives than HB females.
Figure 20 
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Analysis of the data using the Splitting Scale score as 
the personality classification variable reveals a 
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,139) = 
7.36, p<.01, MSe = 5.86, and a trend toward a three way 
condition by personality by congruence interaction, F
(1,139) = 2.83, pc.10, MSe = 5.86. Figure 21 is a graphical 
representation of these results.
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As can be seen in Figure 21, although high and low scorers 
recall similar numbers of congruent adjectives in the 
positive and the negative mood conditions, and although both 
groups recall more non-congruent than congruent adjectives
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in the negative mood condition, low scorers recall 
significantly more non-congruent adjectives in the negative 
mood condition than in the positive mood condition, while 
high scorers recall similar numbers of non-congruent 
adjectives in both mood conditions.
Other effects found in this analysis were a significant 
main effect of sex, F (1,139) = 12.5, pc.001, MSe =13.96, a 
marginally significant personality by sex interaction, F
(1,139) = 3.76, p = .054, MSe = 13.96, and a trend towards a 
condition by sex interaction, F (1,139) = 3.26, pc.10, MSe = 
13.96, on the mean number of adjectives recalled (collapsing 
over the congruence factor).
Generally, females recalled more adjectives than did males 
(M Females = 8.53, M Males = 6.95). High scoring females 
recalled more adjectives than did low scoring females (M HBF 
= 8.93, M LBF = 8.12), while for males this pattern was 
reversed (M HBM = 6.49, M LBM = 7.41). Also, females 
recalled more adjectives in the positive mood condition than 
in the negative mood condition (M F+ = 8.84, 1$ F- = 8.21), 
while for males this pattern was reversed (M M+ = 6.46, M M- 
= 7.44).
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Females Only
Analysis of the data for females revealed a trend toward a 
three way interaction between the condition, personality, 
and congruence factors, F (1,66) = 2.79, p<.10, MSe = 6.57, 
and a significant interaction between the condition and 
personality factors, F (1,66) = 9.15, pc.Ol, MSe = 14.34, 
collapsing over the congruence factor.
Figure 22 
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As can be seen in Figure 22, HB females recall similar 
numbers of congruent and non-congruent list adjectives in 
both the positive and the negative mood conditions, although 
they remember more of both types of adjectives in the 
positive mood condition. On the other hand, LB females
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recall similar numbers of congruent adjectives in both 
conditions, but also recall more non-congruent than 
congruent adjectives in the negative mood condition and more 
congruent than non-congruent adjectives in the positive 
condition.
Figure 23 
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As can be seen in Figure 23, HB females recall more 
adjectives in the positive mood condition, while LB females 
recall more adjectives in the negative mood condition.
Males Only
Analysis of the data for male subjects revealed only one 
significant effect. There was a significant condition by
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congruence interaction, F (1,82) = 5.91, p<.05, MSe = 5.39.
Figure 24 
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As can be seen in Figure 24, males recall about the same 
number of congruent adjectives in both mood conditions. 
However, they recall fewer non-congruent than congruent 
adjectives in the positive mood condition, and more non- 
congruent than congruent adjectives in the negative mood 
condition.
Recall Without First and Last Six List Items
When the first and last six items presented to the 
subjects were excluded from the analyses, no significant 
effects were found in any analyses including the congruence 
factor, although there was a non-significant trend toward a
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main effect for congruence in the analysis of the male data, 
and a non-significant trend toward a two way interaction 
between the condition and congruence factors in the analysis 
when the revised Splitting Scale was used as the personality 
classification variable.
The pattern of results for the between subjects factors in 
these analyses was the same as the patterns observed in the 
analyses of intrusions, list items and intrusions, and list 
items.
Recall Without 1st and Last Six Items by MCMI-II Borderline 
Scale
No significant effects involving the congruence factor 
were found in this analysis. However, a significant main 
effect of sex, F (1,148) = 13.65, pc.001, MSe = 8.34, and a 
significant three way interaction between the condition, 
personality, and sex factors, F (1,148) = 8.32, pc.Ol, MSe = 
8.34, on the mean numbers of adjectives recalled (collapsed 
over the congruence factor) were found.
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Figure 25
Condition by Personality by Sex
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As can be seen in Figure 25, the HB females differ from 
the three other groups in that they alone recall more 
adjectives in the positive condition than in the negative 
condition.
Recall Without 1st and Last Six Items bv Splitting Scale 
Score
There were no significant effects involving the congruence 
factor in this analysis, although there was a trend toward a 
condition by congruence interaction, F (1,139) = 2.94, 
pc.10, MSe = 4.05.
There was a significant main effect of sex, F (1,139) =
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12.32, p<.001, MSe = 8.86, on the mean number of adjectives 
recalled (collapsing over the congruence factor). Females 
recalled an average of 6.4 adjectives, while males recalled 
an average of 5.1 adjectives.
Females Only
No significant effects were found involving the congruence 
factor. However, a significant interaction was found 
between the condition and personality factors, F (1,66) = 
8.77,. p<.01, MSe = 9.02, on the mean number of adjectives 
recalled (collapsed over the congruence factor). Figure 26 
is a graphical representation of this interaction.
Figure 26
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As this figure illustrates, high scorers recalled more 
adjectives in the positive mood condition, while low scorers 
recalled more adjectives in the negative mood condition.
Males Only
No significant effects were found for any factors in this 
analysis, although there was a trend toward a main effect of 
the congruence factor, F (1,82) = 3.0, pc.10, MSe =3.48.
On the average, males recalled more non-congruent than 
congruent adjectives (M Congruent = 4.977, M Non-Congruent = 
5.488).
Recall Results Summary
The results of the recall analyses support the 
hypothesized general positive bias in recall. However, the 
hypothesized three way interaction between the condition, 
personality and congruence factors was only found in the 
analyses of the female data or when the Splitting Scale was 
utilized as the personality classification variable and was 
not in the form hypothesized. Higher scorers did not show 
recall congruence for both moods, but rather showed a 
decrease in positive bias relative to lower scorers 
regardless of their mood, recalling more negative adjectives 
than other subjects in both mood conditions. Higher scorers
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also remembered more of both the positive and negative 
adjectives in the positive mood condition while lower . 
scorers did not show this effect.
Of secondary interest was a consistent pattern involving 
the mean number of adjectives recalled collapsing over the 
congruence factor. In the positive mood condition, females 
recalled more adjectives than males, and HB females recalled 
more adjectives than LB females. In the negative mood 
condition, however, LB females recalled the most adjectives, 
followed by HB males, HB females, and LB males.
Chapter IV 
DISCUSSION
Splitting
As noted in the introduction, the development and 
utilization of the splitting defense is considered by many 
psychodynamic theorists to be of central importance in both 
the diagnosis and etiology of borderline personality 
disorder. While there are a number of different 
conceptualizations of this defense mechanism (e.g. Kernberg, 
1966 & 1975, Kohut, 1971, & Horowitz, 1977), these have in 
common a theme of internal representations, images of self 
and others, and/or memories being split along affective 
lines. Thus the borderline's pathology is thought to 
involve the inability to integrate information of opposing 
affective valences. Therefore, as Marmar & Horowitz (1986) 
have pointed out, when individuals with this defensive 
organization are in one affective state, they have little or 
no access to memories or information which would allow them 
to modulate their feelings, thoughts, or perceptions. As a 
result, their perceptions of themselves and others have a 
black and white quality that varies with their current mood. 
The present study was based on the idea that one would 
expect these individuals to demonstrate stronger mood 
congruency effects for information related to themselves
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than would others. Because of the practical and ethical 
problems inherent in studying this clinical population, an 
analog paradigm was utilized, with comparisons made between 
higher and lower scorers on instruments designed to measure 
borderline pathology and the splitting defense specifically. 
As noted in the results section, the original hypotheses 
were not supported. The question that remains then is what, 
if anything, does this study reveal about the nature of the 
splitting defense.
If one accepts the notion that there is a continuum that 
ranges from mental health to borderline pathology, and if 
one accepts the idea that scores on the assessment devices 
utilized in this study reflect an individual's place on that 
continuum, then this study would seem to suggest that mood 
congruent recall is not involved in the splitting defense, 
at least when individuals are in a relatively mild mood 
state (the mean mood rating at recall in the positive 
condition was 3.2, and in the negative condition was 4.7, 
with a rating of 4 representing neutral). There is a 
problem with this interpretation, however, in that these 
individuals did not show mood congruency in their self- 
referencing either. While the lack of congruency found in 
the self-referencing results can also be explained by the 
relatively mild moods reported by the subjects (the mean 
mood rating at self-referencing in the positive condition
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was 3.2 and in the negative condition was 4.1), there is 
also another problem with this interpretation, having to do 
with the general continuum idea. Theoretically, this 
defensive organization is thought to develop at a very early 
age (Mahler, 1968, 1971) and to be central to the 
development of the whole personality structure (Kernberg, 
1975). Therefore, one would expect that an individual would 
either develop this type of pathology, or would not. In 
other words, according to psychodynamic theories, the idea 
of a person being a little bit borderline is similar to the 
idea of a person being a little bit pregnant. This idea may 
or may not be true. Unfortunately, this experiment (again 
because of the mild mood states induced) did not provide 
information to either support or disconfirm this theoretical 
position.
Taking the above information into account, it seems to me 
that the question of the relationship between mood congruent 
memory and the defense mechanism of splitting remains open. 
This is due in large part to limitations of the experimental 
design. These limitations, which will be discussed in the 
following section, include the weakness of the mood 
induction procedures utilized, and characteristics of the 
subject population and the assessment devices used to 
classify them.
Limitations of the Experimental Design
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As already noted, the moods reported by subjects in both 
conditions and both portions of the experiment were 
relatively mild, with all means less than one point from 
neutral. In contrast to this study, most of the studies 
that have found significant mood congruency effects (e.g. 
Teasdale, et al., 1980) only included subjects who 
demonstrated strong responses to the mood induction 
procedures. In the same vein, it has been demonstrated that 
the effects of mood induction procedures such as those 
utilized in this study are fairly brief in duration (e.g. 
Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983, Chartier, & Ranieri, 1989), 
usually lasting only a few moments at most. In this study, 
because of the number of adjectives presented to the 
subjects, the time that elapsed between the end of the mood 
induction procedure and the complete presentation of the 
adjectives was at least eight minutes. It is likely that 
the very mild effects of the mood inductions reported by the 
subjects were greatly diffused in that time period. Thus 
the present study was in effect comparing two groups of 
subjects who were both in basically neutral moods. It is 
this factor that represents the major flaw in the 
experimental design.
The other factors that represent limitations in the
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present study are related to each other and involve the 
assessment devices used to classify subjects and the nature 
of the subject population utilized. First, it is important 
to recall that the subjects were drawn from a college 
student population and can thus be considered to be 
generally relatively high functioning individuals. Also, 
while the assessment devices chosen to classify subjects for 
this study represented the best self-report measures 
available of the splitting defense and of borderline 
pathology, there are problems with these instruments. The 
only attempt at construct validation of the Splitting Scale 
involved correlating it with two other personality measures. 
A fairly strong negative correlation with a measure of self­
esteem, and a positive (but weaker) correlation with a 
relatively unknown Narcissism scale were obtained. Also, 
while the splitting defense is associated with Borderline 
Personality Disorder, the self-report measures that have 
been created to measure this syndrome have been found to be 
confounded with depressive symptomatology and general 
psychopathology (e.g. Edell, 1984, & Conte et al., 1980). 
Although the MCMI-II Borderline Scale is more widely 
utilized than most scales designed to measure this disorder, 
Millon reports that this scale is also confounded with 
dysthymia and anxiety, and that scores are related to a 
factor interpreted as representing general maladjustment 
(1987).
Given these facts, it is important to consider the score
ranges that subjects obtained on these measures. As noted
in the results section, scores on the Revised Splitting 
Scale were normally distributed and ranged from 20 to 64,
with a mean of 35 in the low scoring group, and a mean of 49
in the high scoring group. This scale consists of 11 seven 
point Likert scales and it is important to keep in mind that 
a score of 44 could be obtained by endorsing 'neither agree 
nor disagree' for each item. Even if one considers that a 
high score on this scale indicates that an individual 
utilizes the splitting defense (which is in itself a 
questionable assumption), there is no data available on what 
constitutes a clinically relevant high score. In any case, 
given the score ranges that were obtained in this sample, it 
is unlikely that more than a few of the subjects in the high 
scoring group had scores that clearly reflected the 
utilization of this defense mechanism.
As was also noted in the results section, scores on the 
MCMI-II BPD scale were not normally distributed and the 
variances of the high and low scoring groups were unequal 
because of the influence of a few extremely high scores.
The obtained scores ranged from 0 to 76, with a mean of 9.5 
in the low scoring group and a mean of 35 in the high 
scoring group. Millon (1987) suggests that raw score cut 
off points of 42 “for males and 51 for females suggest the
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likely presence of this disorder, based on prevalence rates 
of 11 and 14 percent respectively. Again, only a few of the 
subjects in the present study would meet that criteria. It 
should also be noted that as this sample was not drawn from 
a clinical population, the base rates for this disorder 
should be even lower, indicating the need for higher cut off 
scores. Thus it is unlikely that many of the subjects 
obtained scores that would suggest the presence of 
borderline pathology.
It could be argued that these characteristics of the 
subject population and the assessment devices used to 
classify them do not represent true design weaknesses, 
particularly if one accepts the continuum idea. However, 
the lack of real construct validity of the MCMI-II BPD Scale 
and the Splitting Scale may lead one to wonder whether these 
instruments are measuring what they are purported to 
measure. Also, due to the exploratory nature of the 
research, it would make sense to maximize the probability of 
obtaining significant results by using actual clinical 
subjects, as one would expect these individuals to be most 
likely to demonstrate these effects.
Discussion of Experimental Results
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While on the surface, the results obtained in this study 
appear rather complex, most of what was found can be 
explained fairly simply by referring to what is known about 
the personality measures utili2ed in the study, encoding 
biases, self-concept, and gender differences in self esteem.
Generally, the results support the idea that individuals 
in relatively neutral mood states demonstrate positive 
biases in self-judgments and in either the encoding or 
retrieval of information related to the self. Both males 
and females who are higher scorers on the Splitting Scale 
and females who are higher scorers on the MCMI-II BPD scale, 
however, demonstrate less positive bias than their lower 
scoring counterparts. In the following pages, these results 
will be discussed in more detail.
Self-Referencing
As noted above, females who were higher scorers on the 
MCMI-II BPD scale and all subjects who were higher scorers 
on the Splitting Scale rated more negative adjectives as 
applying to themselves than did lower scoring subjects, 
regardless of their mood condition. Male higher scorers on 
the MCMI-II BPD scale rated more negative adjectives as
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applying to themselves than did lower scorers in the 
negative mood condition only.
It makes sense that individuals who would endorse more 
problems on a psychological test would also endorse more 
negative adjectives as applying to themselves in this 
experiment. But why were the results different when the 
MCMI-II BPD Scale or the Splitting Scale was used to 
classify subjects? And why were the results different for 
males and females when the MCMI-II BPD scale was used to 
classify them? To answer these questions, it will be helpful 
to think about the nature of the two different scales. 
Because the MCMI-II BPD Scale has many varied items that are 
differentially weighted, there are a number of ways to 
obtain a relatively high score on this measure. The 
Splitting Scale, however, is more brief and homogeneous and 
negatively correlates with a measure of self-esteem.
It is generally accepted that women have more self-esteem 
problems than do men (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). Combining 
this information with what is known about the two scales, we 
can begin to make sense out of the observed pattern of 
results. Concerning the results obtained when utilizing 
Splitting Scale scores as the classification variable, it 
makes sense that higher scorers on this measure (individuals 
with self-esteem problems) would endorse more negative items
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as referring to themselves than individuals without such 
problems. Also, while no item analysis was done to look at 
the ways in which males and females arrived at their scores 
on the MCMI-II BPD scale, it makes sense that the actual 
items endorsed by subjects of each sex may have differed, 
although their total scores did not. Thus it is guite 
possible that females who were higher scorers on this 
measure may have endorsed more items reflecting low self­
esteem than did males who were higher scorers.
What is particularly interesting about the results when 
the MCMI-II BPD Scale was used to classify subjects is that 
they seem to suggest a tendency toward mood congruence of 
self-referencing in male high scorers (in a very mild 
negative mood state), but a general lessening of positive 
bias in female high scorers. These results appear to 
conflict with previous research indicating that women show 
stronger mood congruency effects than males do (Clark & 
Teasdale, 1982). However, in understanding these results we 
need to keep in mind the differences in self esteem noted 
above. Because of women's lower self-esteem, it is possible 
that negative aspects of their self image are generally 
available to them, regardless of their current mood state. 
Males, however, may only experience these aspects of their 
self- concepts while in a negative mood.
Intrusions versus List Recall
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The first question that one might want to ask is why would 
subjects' intrusions be mood congruent while their recall of 
list items was not? To answer this question, it will be 
important to keep in mind the fact that the mood ratings of 
subjects in each of the two experimental conditions were not 
very different from neutral. As noted earlier, it has been 
demonstrated in previous research that subjects who are not 
particularly responsive to mood induction procedures do not 
show recall congruency (e.g. Teasdale & Russell, 1983). 
However, to my knowledge, researchers have not looked at the 
mood congruency of subjects' intrusions. If mood congruence 
is a real phenomenon, then one would expect these pseudo­
recalled items to be mood congruent and sensitive to subtle 
mood states, as they are self-generated, and are not under 
conscious control. The fact that these were congruent in 
very mild mood states is quite interesting. While there 
were no personality differences found involving the 
congruence of the subjects' intrusions, it is important to 
keep in mind the fact that the moods of the subjects were 
not particularly intense and the scores obtained on the 
personality measures may not have reflected either 
borderline pathology or the utilization of the splitting 
defense.
Number of Adjectives Recalled
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Another relatively simple and consistent finding involved 
the numbers of adjectives recalled by different subjects in 
the two mood conditions. To understand this pattern of 
results, it will be important to consider sex and 
personality differences in the relevance of information 
about personality traits. It has been found that women are 
more interpersonally oriented than are men (Gilligan, 1982). 
Research has supported the idea that trait adjectives are 
more generally meaningful and more often utilized in talking 
or in thinking by women than by men (e.g. Clark & Teasdale, 
1985). It also seems reasonable to expect that individuals 
who admit to having more problems would find such adjectives 
to be more salient or relevant than individuals who admit to 
having less problems. Therefore it makes sense that women 
would generally recall more of these evaluative trait 
adjectives than would men and that higher scorers would 
recall more than lower scorers. The one apparently somewhat 
odd finding was the fact that women who were higher scorers 
on the MCMI-II BPD scale recalled many more adjectives than 
did lower scoring women in the positive mood condition, but 
they recalled somewhat fewer than lower scoring women in the 
negative mood condition. One explanation of this might be 
that the cognitive functioning of the higher scoring women 
(who likely had lower self-esteem and/or were less happy
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generally) was more sensitive to the influence of a mildly 
negative mood state than was the functioning of the lower 
scoring women. This idea is consistent with previous 
findings that depressive feelings constrain learning or 
memory processes and cognitive functioning generally 
(Breslow, Kocsis, & Belkin, 1981).
Differences in Positive Bias in Recall
As noted previously, higher scorers on the Splitting Scale 
and female higher scorers who were classified on the basis 
of their scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale did not show the 
same degree of positive bias in recall as did lower scorers 
on these measures or males who were higher scorers on the 
MCMI-II BPD scale. Why might this have been the case?
Research has shown that normal individuals develop what 
have been termed self-enhancing biases (Taylor & Brown,
1988) and that depressed individuals demonstrate what has 
been termed depressive realism (e.g. Alloy & Abramson,
1979). More recent research has demonstrated the 
development of self-perpetuating encoding biases (e.g. Hill, 
Lewicki, & Neubauer, 1991). The results of this study would 
suggest that many individuals (the low scorers on these 
measures and also the males that were high scorers on the 
MCMI-II BPD Scale) have a somewhat pervasive tendency either
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to encode or to recall predominantly positive information 
about themselves. The higher scorers on the Splitting Scale 
and the female higher scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale do 
not show this bias, however.
This suggests that it is not that these individuals have a 
bias to recall negative information, but that they lack the 
positive bias that the lower scorers show. Whether this is 
the cause or the result of their lower self-esteem is not 
clear. However, it does suggest that they would likely be 
more prone to depression than lower scorers on these measure 
as they are more cognizant of negative information about 
themselves than the lower scorers. Why higher scoring males 
differ from higher scoring females in this respect is not 
clear. However, as feminist theory suggests, male qualities 
and males generally are more highly valued in our culture. 
Thus males may be attended to and praised more often, which 
may lead to the differences that are found in self-esteem 
between the sexes. In addition, males tend to have a, 
different coping style than females. While females tend to 
spend time thinking about their problems, men tend to push 
such thoughts out of their mind, and to take action to 
attempt to solve their problems instead. Thus males tend to 
have more experiences of mastery than do women, leading to 
increased self-confidence, self-worth, and life satisfaction 
(McGrath, Keita, Strickland, & Russo, 1990).
Implications of These Findings
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There are a number of possible implications of these 
findings. For example, one wonders if lower scorers on 
measures designed to tap into psychopathology are 
individuals who have a bias to recall positive information 
related to themselves, or whether they recall more positive 
than negative information because they find it more salient 
or relevant. The evidence in this area is mixed. It is 
true that the results in the self-referencing and recall 
portions of this experiment are generally parallel, but 
although it has been found in previous research that 
subjects recall items that they have rated as applying to 
themselves slightly better than items that they have rated 
as not applying to themselves, this result has generally not 
reached significance. If there is in fact a positive bias 
operating, this could call into question the validity of 
self-report measures of psychopathology, as individuals are 
often not aware of their own maladaptive behaviors. In 
support of this idea is the fact that a number of subjects 
in the current study did not endorse any problems or 
negative adjectives as applying to them, and it would seem 
likely that all individuals have some problems or negative 
traits. On the other hand, it is possible that, as previous 
research has suggested, this lack of awareness and 
distortion of reality is necessary for healthy adjustment
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(e.g. Taylor & Brown, Alloy & Abramson). If this is in fact 
the case, it would call into question some of the basic 
tenets of insight oriented therapy, in which individuals are 
encouraged to become aware of both their positive and their 
negative characteristics.
Directions for Future Research
Unfortunately, this research was unable to adequately 
address the original question regarding splitting and mood 
congruency because of aspects of the experimental design and 
of the subject population. The mood inductions that were 
utilized in this study were not powerful enough to enable 
the study of this phenomenon, and it is also likely that the 
subject population did not include enough individuals who 
relied on the splitting defense to adequately test the 
experimental hypotheses. One also wonders whether the use 
of an adjective list is the best way to get at individuals' 
self-concept. Given these factors, it would seem reasonable 
to design another study to attempt to study the relationship 
between mood congruent recall and splitting, with stronger 
mood induction procedures, a clinical population, and 
possibly a different recall task. For example, having 
subjects generate their own list of self-descriptors and 
then testing recall at a later time might tap into self- 
concept more accurately. It would also be interesting to
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administer the splitting scale to two groups of subjects, 
one group judged by their clinicians to utilize this defense 
mechanism and the other group judged not to exhibit this 
defense mechanism to see if this is in fact what this scale 
is measuring.
There are also a number of further analyses of this data 
that might be interesting. One could perform an item 
analysis on the subjects7 MCMI-II Borderline Scale scores to 
see if men and women did in fact arrive at higher scores 
differently. One could analyze the subjects7 recall of the 
items that they rated as applying to themselves and the 
items that they rated as not applying to themselves 
separately to see if different patterns might be revealed.
There are also a number of other possible projects that 
this research has suggested. One idea would be to correlate 
scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale and the Splitting Scale with 
measures of depression and self esteem.
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Appendix A 
MCMI II - Borderline Scale
(All keyed true - weights in parentheses)
Subjects are asked to say whether the following items are
true of them or not by marking true of false on the answer
sheet. If they can not decide about an item, they are
instructed to mark it false.
1. (2) In the last few weeks I begin to cry even when the 
slightest of things goes wrong.
2. (1) As a teenager I got into lots of trouble because of 
bad school behavior.
3. (2) If my family puts pressure on me I am likely to get
angry and resist doing what they want.
4. (2) I often feel I should be punished for the things I
have done.
5. (3) Other people seem more sure than I am of who they 
are and what they want.
6 . (2) I tend to burst out in tears or in anger for unknown 
reasons.
7. (2) I began to feel lonely and empty about a year or two 
ago.
8 . (2) My drug habits have often gotten me into a good deal 
of trouble in the past.
9. (1) Lately, I find myself crying without any reason.
10. (1) In the past I've gotten involved sexually with many 
people who didn't matter much to me.
11. (3) My own "bad temper" has been a big cause of my 
troubles.
12. (1) I don't mind bullying others to get them to do what 
I want.
13. (2) I'm a very erratic person, changing my mind and 
feelings all the time.
14. (1) I feel very tense when I think of the day's 
happenings.
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15. (1) Lately, my strength seems to be draining out of me, 
even in the morning.
16. (1) I began to feel like a failure some years ago.
17. (3) I have always had a terrible fear that I will lose 
the love of people I need very much.
18. (1) I seem to go out of my way to let people take 
advantage of me.
19. (3) Lately I have begun to feel like smashing things.
20. (2) I have given serious thought lately to doing away 
with myself.
21. (1) Some people say I enjoy suffering.
22. (2) I often let my angry feelings out and then I 
feel terribly guilty about it.
23. (1) Lately I feel jumpy and under terrible strain, but I 
don't know why.
24. (1) I can't seem to sleep and wake up just as tired as 
when I went to bed.
25. (3) I've done a number of stupid things on impulse that 
ended up causing me great trouble.
26. (1) I never forgive an insult or forget an embarrassment 
that someone caused me.
27. (1) I am the sort of person that others take advantage 
of.
28. (1) I always try to please others even when I dislike 
them.
29. (2 ) Serious thoughts of suicide have occurred to me for 
many years.
30. (3) I can't understand it but I seem to enjoy hurting 
persons I love.
31. (2)1 don't see anything wrong with using people to get 
what I want.
32. (1) I ran away from home as a teenager at least once.
33. (2) I very often say things quickly that I regret having 
said.
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34. (2) For some time now I have been feeling very guilty 
because I can't do things right anymore.
35. (1) I've become quite discouraged and sad about life in 
the last year or two.
36. (2) I don't know why but I sometimes say cruel things 
just to make others unhappy.
37. (1) I speak out my opinions about things no matter what 
others may think.
38. (1) When someone in authority insists that I do 
something, I'm likely to put it off or do it poorly on 
purpose.
39. (1) I just don't have the strength to fight back 
anymore.
40. (1) I often think that I don't deserve the good things 
that happen to me.
41. (3) I feel pretty aimless and don't know where I"m going 
in life.
42. (3) Sometimes I feel like I must do something to hurt 
myself or someone else.
43. (3) My moods seem to change a great deal from one day to 
the next.
44. (2) I don't blame anyone who takes advantage of someone 
who allows it.
45. (1) I've changed jobs more than three times in the past 
couple of years.
46. (1) For some time now I've been feeling sad and blue and 
can't seem to snap out of it.
47. (1) I really get annoyed with people who expect me to do 
what I don't want to do.
48. (2) In the last few years I have felt so guilty that I 
may do something terrible to myself.
49. (1) I sometimes get confused and feel upset when people 
are kind to me.
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50. (2) My use of so-called illegal drugs has led to family 
arguments.
51. (2) There are members of my family who say I'm selfish 
and think only of myself.
52. (1) Frankly, I lie quite often to get out of trouble.
53. (1) My parents often told me that I was no good.
54. (1) I deserve the suffering I've gone through in life.
55. (3) My feelings toward important people in my life often 
swing from loving them to hating them.
56. (2) My parents always disagreed with eachother.
57. (1) I used to be really restless, traveling around from 
place to place with no idea of where I would end up.
58. (1) I get very irritated if someone demands that I do 
things his way rather than my own.
59. (1) Lately, I have gone all to pieces.
60. (1) I seem to encourage the people I love to hurt me.
61. (3) People who I admired greatly at first have often 
become real disappointments to me later.
62. (1) I prefer to be with people who will be protective of 
me.
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Appendix B 
Splitting Scale
Subjects are asked to respond to items describing "how 
people feel” by circling a number from 1 to 7 to indicate 
whether the items are not at all true (1) to very true (7) 
of them
*in the absence of a current relationship, subjects are 
asked to recall their most recent relationship
1. I hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
1 : 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb.
1 2 3 4 1 5 6 7
3. When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten.
_  _ _ _ _ _  _ _
4. My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by 
people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
1 ~2 3 4 5 ’ 6 7
6 . It's very painful when someone disappoints me.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
7. I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their 
children.
1 2 T~ 4 5 6 7
8 . Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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9. There are times when my wife (husband)/ girlfriend 
(boyfriend) seems as strong as iron, and at other times 
as helpless as a baby.*
_ _ _ __ _ _ _
10. I often feel like I can't put the different parts of my 
personality together so that there is one me.
_ _ - 4 5 ~6 7
11. Sometimes I feel my love is dangerous.
_ _ _ _ _ _
12. When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I 
really dislike.
1 2 3~ 4 5 6 7
13. It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm 
depressed.
1 2 1  ~  4 5 6 7
14. Some people have too much power over me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix C
Image Distorting Subscale - DSQ
Subjects are asked to rate the degree to which they agree or 
disagree with each statement by circling a number from one 
to nine, with one indicating that they strongly disagree and 
nine indicating that they strongly agree.
1. I am superior to most people I know.
_  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^
2. I often feel superior to people I'm with.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^
3. I ignore danger as if I were superman.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. I pride myself on my ability to cut people down to size.
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _  ^
5. I'm a real put down artist.
_ _ _ - _ - 7 8 9
6. I've got special talents that allow me to go through life 
with no problems.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^
7. I fear nothing.
- — - - 4 5 6 7 8 9
8 . Sometimes I think I'm an angel and other times I think 
I'm a devil.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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9. As far as I'm concerned, people are either good or bad.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. I always feel that someone I know is like a guardian 
angel.
_ _ _ _ _ “ 7 ! i 9
11. There's no such thing as finding a little good in 
everyone. If you're bad, you're all bad.
_ —  - - 5 6 7 8 9
12. There is someone I know who can do anything and who 
is absolutely fair and just.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Appendix D 
Screening Materials
Feeling Scale
Please respond to the following items that describe ways 
that people feel by circling a number from 1 to 7, with 1 
indicating that you strongly disagree and 7 indicating that 
you strongly agree with the statement.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly neither . strongly
disagree agree nor agree
disagree
1. I hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
As far as I'm concerned, people are either good or bad.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am superior to most people I :know.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I pride myself on my ability to cut people down to size
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. I ignore danger as if I were superman.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 . When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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8 . I've got special talents that allow me to go through life 
with no problems.
1 ~ 2 3 4 5 1 6~ 7
9. My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by
people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Sometimes I think I'm an angel and other times I think
I'm a devil.
1 2 3 4 : 5 6 7
11. It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. It's very painful when someone disappoints me.
1 2 3 4 5 6" 7
13. I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their 
children.
1 2 3 4 5 6 ~7
14. Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
T" 1 3 4 5 6 7
15. There are times when my wife (husband)/ girlfriend 
(boyfriend) seems as strong as iron, and at other times 
as helpless as a baby.
(if you are not currently involved in a relationship, 
please recall your most recent relationship)
1 2 3 4 ~5 6 7
16. I'm a real put down artist.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. I always feel that someone I know is like a guardian 
angel.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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18. I often feel like I can't put the different parts of my 
personality together so that there is one me.
1 ~2 3 4 5 6 7
19. There is someone I know who can do anything and who is 
absolutely fair and just.
1 2 3 4 ' 5 6 7
20. Sometimes I feel my love is dangerous.
1 2 3 4 5 ~6 7
21. I often feel superior to people I'm with.
1 2 3 4~ 5 6 7
22. When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I 
really dislike.
_ _ _ _ . _ - 7
23. I fear nothing.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm 
depressed.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. There's no such thing as finding a little good in 
everyone. If you're bad, you're all bad.
_  _ - 4 5 e~ 7
26. Some people have too much power over me.
1 2 3 4 5 1 6 7
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Please circle the number that most accurately reflects your 
current feelings.
RIGHT NOW MY MOOD IS:
very good neither good very bad
nor bad
Personality Questionnaire
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Please say whether the following items are true of you or 
not by circling true or false for each item. If you can not 
decide about an item, please mark it false.
T F 1. In the last few weeks I begin to cry even when the 
slightest of things goes wrong.
T F 2. As a teenager I got into lots of trouble because
of bad school behavior.
T F 3. If my family puts pressure on me I am likely to
get angry and resist doing what they want.
T F 4. I often feel I should be punished for the things I 
have done.
T F 5. Other people seem more sure than I am of who they 
are and what they want.
T F 6 . I tend to burst out in tears or in anger for
unknown reasons.
T F 7. I began to feel lonely and empty about a year or
two ago.
T F 8 . My drug habits have often gotten me into a good
deal of trouble in the past.
T F 9. Lately, I find myself crying without any reason.
T F 10. In the past I've gotten involved sexually with
many people who didn't matter much to me.
T F 11. My own "bad temper" has been a big cause of my 
troubles.
T F 12. I don't mind bullying others to get them to do 
what I want.
T F 13. I'm a very erratic person, changing my mind and 
feelings all the time.
T F 14. I feel very tense when I think of the day's 
happenings.
T F 15. Lately, my strength seems to be draining out of 
me, even in the morning.
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T F 16. I began to feel like a failure some years ago.
T F 17. I have always had a terrible fear that I will lose
the love of people I need very much.
T F 18. I seem to go out of my way to let people take
advantage of me.
T F 19. Lately I have begun to feel like smashing things.
T F 20. I have given serious thought lately to doing away
with myself.
T F 21. Some people say I enjoy suffering.
T F 22. I often let my angry feelings out and then I feel
terribly guilty about it.
T F 23. Lately I feel jumpy and under terrible strain, but
I don't know why.
T F 24. I can't seem to sleep and wake up just as tired as
when I went to bed.
T F 25. I've done a number of stupid things on impulse
that ended up causing me great trouble.
T F 26. I never forgive an insult or forget an
embarrassment that someone caused me.
T F 27. I am the sort of person that others take advantage
of.
T F 28. I always try to please others even when I dislike 
them.
T F 29. Serious thoughts of suicide have occurred to me 
for many years.
T F 30. I can't understand it but I seem to enjoy hurting 
persons I love.
T F 31. I don't see anything wrong with using people to 
get what I want.
T F 32. I ran away from home as a teenager at least once.
T F 33. I very often say things quickly that I regret 
having said.
T F 34. For some time now I have been feeling very guilty 
because I can't do things right anymore.
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T F 35. I've become quite discouraged and sad about life 
in the last year or two.
T F 36. I don't know why but I sometimes say cruel things 
just to make others unhappy.
T F 37. I speak out my opinions about things no matter 
what others may think.
T F 38. When someone in authority insists that I do 
something, I'm likely to put it off or do it 
poorly on purpose.
T F 39. I just don't have the strength to fight back 
anymore.
T F 40. I often think that I don't deserve the good things 
that happen to me.
T F 41. I feel pretty aimless and don't know where I"m 
going in life.
T F 42. Sometimes I feel like I must do something to hurt 
myself or someone else.
T F 43. My moods seem to change a great deal from one day 
to the next.
T F 44. I don't blame anyone who takes advantage of 
someone who allows it.
T F 45. I've changed jobs more than three times in the 
past couple of years.
T F 46. For some time now I've been feeling sad and blue 
and can't seem to snap out of it.
T F 47. I really get annoyed with people who expect me to 
do what I don't want to do.
T F 48. In the last few years I have felt so guilty that I 
may do something terrible to myself.
T F 49. I sometimes get confused and feel upset when 
people are kind to me.
T F 50. My use of so-called illegal drugs has led to 
family arguments.
T F 51. There are members of my family who say I'm selfish 
and think only of myself.
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T F 52. Frankly, I lie quite often to get out of trouble.
T F 53. My parents often told me that I was no good,
T F 54. I deserve the suffering I've gone through in life.
T F 55. My feelings toward important people in my life 
often swing from loving them to hating them.
T F 56. My parents always disagreed with eachother.
T F 57. I used to be really restless, traveling around
from place to place with no idea of where I would 
end up.
T F 58. I get very irritated if someone demands that I do 
things his way rather than my own.
T F 59. Lately, I have gone all to pieces.
T F 60. I seem to encourage the people I love to hurt me.
T F 61. People who I admired greatly at first have often 
become real disappointments to me later.
T F 62. I prefer to be with people who will be protective 
of me.
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Appendix E 
Subject Instructions
Please be seated at one of the desks that contains a packet 
of materials, but do not look at the materials yet.
(WHEN EVERYONE IS SEATED)
If you do not have either a pen or a pencil, please raise 
your hand and we will bring you one.
(WHEN EVERYONE HAS A PEN OR PENCIL)
In the study today, you will be participating in a number of 
experiences involving various mental processes. Some of 
these will involve judgments of various kinds, some of these 
will involve concentration, and some of these will involve 
reasoning. We will be asking you to rate your mood after 
each task.
Please turn over your packet and fill out the first page. 
This page will be separated from the rest of your materials, 
and kept in a separate place, to ensure the confidentiality 
of your experimental materials. Only the primary researcher 
will have access to this identifying information, and only 
so that you can be contacted again, if necessary. All the 
rest of your materials will be identified only by a subject 
number. Please print clearly.
Please do not turn the page until you are instructed to do 
so.
♦First we would like you to listen to some music. Please try 
to really get into it, as we will be asking you some 
questions about your experience of it afterwards. You may 
even want to close your eyes.
(PLAY TAPE)
(WHEN MUSIC ENDS)
Please turn to the next page on which you will find three 
questions asking you to rate your experience. Please do 
these ratings now.
(PAUSE)
Please raise your hand if you are not finished.
(WHEN EVERYONE IS FINISHED)
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Please turn to the next page.
We will now be presenting some adjectives to you on the 
screen here. Each one will be presented for 5 seconds. For 
each one, please circle yes or no to indicate whether it 
applies to you. Circle yes if you think it applies to you 
generally or if you can think of a specific instance in your 
life in which it has applied to you. Please rate them in 
order, from 1 to 54. Again, please do not turn the page 
until you are asked to do so.
(PRESENT ADJECTIVES)
OK, now turn the page.
The next three pages contain arithmetic problems of 
different types. Please work on these problems until you are 
asked to stop. If you come to a problem that you are having 
a hard time with or find frustrating, just go on to the next 
one. If you happen to finish before we tell you to stop, 
please just sit quietly.
(AFTER 8 MINUTES)
ok, you can stop now.
Turn to page 8 and rate your mood right now. Then turn to 
the next page, which should be blank.
On the seat next to you, you will find a small booklet with 
one statement on each page. I'll be asking you to read
through these booklets, trying hard to get into the mood
states described by each statement. For each statement, 
imagine a time when you felt like this and bring back that 
feeling. Really try to feel the feelings. Its very important 
that you become as involved in this as you can. Read through 
the statements at your own rate. As you read each statement 
think of a time you felt like that and imagine that feeling. 
You can spend more time on statements that you find really
effective and less time on statements that you find less
effective. Just repeat the statements to yourself into you 
really feel that feeling. When you finish reading through 
the booklet, read through it again, allowing your feelings 
to build, ok, start now.
(AFTER 7 MINUTES)
ok, you can stop now.
Turn to the next page in your packet of materials, which 
should be page 10 and rate your mood right now.
(AFTER 1 MINUTE)
133
ok, please turn the page. Now I'd like you to write down as 
many of the adjectives from the blue slides as you can 
remember, in any order in which you remember them. Please 
write clearly, but don't worry about spelling.
(AFTER 7 MINUTES)
ok, you can stop now. Before you leave you will need to come 
up and sign the sheet to receive experimental credit. Also, 
any of you who are interested in finding out the results of 
the study can sign up on a special sheet, and the final 
results will be mailed to you. Please don't tell other 
students about the memory part of this experiment for the 
next few weeks, as that could destroy the validity of the 
study. If you have any questions about any part of this 
study, you can contact Elizabeth Bell through the Psychology 
department. Thank you very much for your participation.
(Play Happy music)
Appendix F 
Mood Statements
(NEGATIVE CONDITION)
I FEEL UNHAPPY.
I FEEL SAD AND BLUE.
I FEEL FED UP.
I JUST FEEL DRAINED OF ENERGY, WORN OUT.
I FEEL PRETTY LOW.
THINGS SEEM FUTILE, POINTLESS.
I FEEL HOPELESS.
I FEEL DOWNHEARTED AND MISERABLE.
I FEEL SO TIRED AND GLOOMY THAT I WOULD RATHER JUST SIT THAN 
DO ANYTHING.
I FEEL HEAVY AND SLUGGISH.
IT SEEMS SUCH AN EFFORT TO DO MUCH.
I'M FED UP WITH IT ALL.
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(POSITIVE CONDITION)
I FEEL PRETTY GOOD RIGHT NOW.
I FEEL HAPPY.
*»
I FEEL CHEERFUL, CONFIDENT.
I CAN THINK QUICKLY AND CLEARLY RIGHT NOW. 
RIGHT NOW, I FEEL VERY CONTENTED. 
RIGHT NOW, I FEEL LIKE SMILING.
I FEEL ALERT, HAPPY, AND FULL OF ENERGY.
I HAVE A FEELING OF LIGHTNESS AND JOY.
I REALLY LIKE THIS LIGHTHEARTED FEELING.
I CAN FEEL A SMILE ON MY FACE.
I FEEL SO GOOD I ALMOST FEEL LIKE LAUGHING. 
IT FEELS GREAT TO BE ALIVE
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Appendix G 
Subject Packet
PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY
NAME:___________________________
SEX: (CIRCLE) FEMALE MALE 
AGE:______________________ ______
PHONE NUMBER:
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PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT MOST ACCURATELY REFLECTS YOUR 
EXPERIENCE
1. HOW INVOLVING WAS THE MUSIC? (HOW MUCH DID YOU GET INTO 
IT?)
I_______ 2_______ 3_____ __4_______ 5_______ 6_______ Z
not at all very involving
involving
2. WHAT WAS THE EMOTIONAL TONE OF THE MUSIC?
7
very very
cheerful sad
3. HOW DO YOU FEEL RIGHT NOW?
very happy very unhappy
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53. YES NO
1. YES NO
2. YES NO
3. YES NO
4 . YES NO
S. YES NO
6. YES NO
7. YES NO
8. YES NO
9. YES NO
XO. YES NO
11. YES NO
12. YES NO
13. YES NO
14. YES NO
15. YES MO
16. YES NO
17. YES MO
18. YES NO
19. YES NO
20. YES NO
21. YES NO
22. YES NO
23. YES NO
24. YES NO
25. YES NO
26. YES NO
27. YES NO
28. YES NO
29. YES NO
30. YES NO
31. YES NO
32. YES NO
33. YES NO
34. YES NO
35. YES NO
36. YES NO
37 . YES NO
38. YES NO
39. YES NO
40. YES NO
41. YES NO
42. YES NO
43. YES NO
44. YES NO
45. YES NO
46. YES NO
47. YES NO
48. YES NO
49. YES NO
50. YES NO
Si. YES NO
52. YES NO
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Please circle the number that most accurately reflects your 
current feelings.
RIGHT NOW I FEEL:
very happy neither happy very
nor unhappy
unhappy
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143
Please circle the number that most accurately reflects your 
current feelings.
RIGHT NOW I FEEL:
very happy neither happy very
nor unhappy
unhappy
PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY
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Appendix H 
Adjective List
kind moody sincere
self reliant capable energetic
unappreciative patient malicious
incompetent lazy dependable
gossipy relaxed greedy
modest cowardly oversensitive
grouchy thoughtful confident
jumpy forgiving
talented egotistical
loyal humorless
boring shallow
generous easy going
rude imaginative
intelligent phony
warm understanding
friendly unfriendly
irresponsible helpful
cold observant
dishonest mean
incompetent pleasant
humorous honest
maladjusted pessimistic
jealous careless
enthusiastic sincere
